纽约时报双语版

黄仁勋“最后一刻”获邀随特朗普访华

Wed, 13 May 2026 06:36:32 +0000

TRIPP MICKLE, ANA SWANSON

2026年5月13日

硅谷芯片巨头英伟达的首席执行官黄仁勋，3月摄于加州圣何塞. Manuel Orbegozo for The New York Times

President Trump welcomed Jensen Huang, the chief executive of the chip giant Nvidia, late Tuesday onto Air Force One as he headed to Beijing for a summit with China’s leader.

周二晚些时候，特朗普在“空军一号”上迎来了芯片巨头英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋。他即将前往北京，与中国领导人举行峰会。

Mr. Huang, who leads the world’s most valuable company, had been omitted from a list of business leaders slated to travel to China. But after seeing reports that Mr. Huang wasn’t coming, Mr. Trump called him on Tuesday morning and extended an invitation, said a person familiar with the call.

黄仁勋执掌着全球市值最高的公司，但他并未出现在原定随行赴华的商界领袖名单上。一位知情人士透露，特朗普在看到黄仁勋未获邀请的相关报道后，于周二上午亲自致电，向其发出邀请。

Mr. Huang flew to Alaska late Tuesday and boarded Air Force One during a layover. For nearly a year, he has been lobbying officials in Washington and Beijing to allow Nvidia to sell its artificial intelligence chips to China.

黄仁勋于周二晚些时候飞抵阿拉斯加，在“空军一号”经停期间登机。近一年来，他一直在游说华盛顿和北京的官员，希望允许英伟达向中国出售人工智能芯片。

“Jensen is currently on Air Force One,” Mr. Trump said in a social media post. He said it was an honor to have the Nvidia chief executive, who he called “the Great Jensen Huang,” and other business leaders “journeying to the Great Country of China where I will be asking President Xi, a Leader of extraordinary distinction, to ‘open up’ China so that these brilliant people can work their magic.”

“黄仁勋现在正在‘空军一号’上，”特朗普在社交媒体上发帖称。他表示，很荣幸能邀请到这位英伟达的首席执行官（他称之为“伟大的黄仁勋”）以及其他商界领袖“前往中国这个伟大的国家，在那里我将请求习近平主席——一位具有卓越非凡领导力的领导人——‘开放’中国，以便这些才华横溢的人施展他们的魔法”。

On Monday, the White House released a list of 16 chief executives, including Tim Cook of Apple, Larry Fink of BlackRock and leaders of other companies pushing for deals with China. It did not include Mr. Huang.

周一，白宫公布了一份由16位首席执行官组成的随行人员名单，包括苹果公司的蒂姆·库克、贝莱德的拉里·芬克，以及其他寻求与中国达成协议的企业领袖，黄仁勋不在其中。

That omission was noted across Silicon Valley and Washington. Mr. Huang has forged a strong relationship with Mr. Trump and has acted as a go-between for the administration between Washington and Beijing. His company’s chips have been critical to the A.I. boom that is reshaping the global economy, and are coveted by governments and companies across the world.

这一缺席在硅谷和华盛顿都引发了广泛关注。黄仁勋与特朗普建立了密切关系，并在政府与北京之间扮演着中间人的角色。英伟达的芯片对于重塑全球经济格局的人工智能热潮至关重要，受到世界各国政府和企业的竞相追捧。

Selling A.I. chips to China has been contentious in Washington.

在华盛顿，对华出售人工智能芯片一直是一个充满争议的议题。

Last summer, Mr. Trump approved the sale of an older generation of Nvidia chips to China and planned to take a cut of those sales. But the Chinese government hasn’t approved any purchases.

去年夏天，特朗普批准向中国出售上一代英伟达芯片，并计划从这些销售中抽成。但中国政府尚未批准任何采购。

Some Republicans have supported legislation that would limit the scope of those sales, and last year, members of Mr. Trump’s own administration intervened to discourage him from permitting the sale of even more advanced A.I. chips for national security reasons.

一些共和党人支持立法限制这些芯片的销售范围，而去年，特朗普自己政府内的成员出于国家安全考虑，曾出面劝说他不要批准出售更先进的人工智能芯片。

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中国曾寻求获取Anthropic最新技术但遭拒绝

Wed, 13 May 2026 06:36:31 +0000

DUSTIN VOLZ, JULIAN E. BARNES, SHEERA FRENKEL, TRIPP MICKLE

2026年5月13日

越来越多的国家安全官员和分析人士开始将中美之间日益激烈的人工智能竞争比作冷战时期的核军备竞赛。 Marissa Leshnov for The New York Times

A representative from a Chinese think tank approached officials from Anthropic at a meeting in Singapore last month to insist that the company change its stance and give Beijing access to its powerful new artificial intelligence model, according to people briefed on the discussions.

据知情人士透露，上个月在新加坡举行的一次会议上，一家中国智库的代表接触了Anthropic公司官员，坚持要求该公司改变立场，允许北京方面使用其强大的新人工智能模型。

Anthropic refused.

Anthropic拒绝了。

The request was not an official demand from the Chinese government. But the talks in Singapore were a form of exchange that is often meant to pave the way for formal, direct diplomacy.

这一请求并非中国政府的正式要求。但新加坡的这次会谈是一种常见的交流形式，通常旨在为正式、直接的外交铺平道路。

When officials from the National Security Council at the White House learned about the exchange at the meeting, which was convened by the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, they reacted with alarm. Some Trump administration officials saw it as another sign that Beijing would try every possible avenue to swiftly acquire the most powerful artificial intelligence model a U.S. company has produced so far, according to people briefed on the discussions.

获悉这次会议的交流内容后，白宫国家安全委员会官员表示警觉。据知情人士透露，一些特朗普政府官员将此视为另一个信号，表明北京会尝试一切可能的途径，迅速获取美国公司迄今为止开发的最强大人工智能模型。此次会议由总部位于华盛顿的卡内基国际和平基金会召集。

However subtle, the outreach is a sign of the intensifying competition between China and the United States over artificial intelligence, which a growing number of national security officials and analysts have begun to liken to the Cold War’s nuclear arms race. Chinese analysts see the release of the latest models from Anthropic and ChatGPT as a significant advance in American technology, one that could pose a threat to China.

尽管方式微妙，但此次接触显示中美在人工智能领域的竞争正在加剧。越来越多的国家安全官员和分析人士开始将这场竞争比作冷战时期的核军备竞赛。中国分析人士认为，Anthropic和ChatGPT最新模型的发布是美国技术的重大进步，可能对中国构成威胁。

The escalating rivalry is an important backdrop to the summit this week between the United States and China. President Trump is scheduled to arrive in Beijing on Wednesday, for meetings with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping. While the race to develop the most effective model is unlikely to be discussed, the two sides could talk about access to the chips that power artificial intelligence or guardrails around its use.

这一不断升级的竞争是本周中美峰会的重要背景。特朗普总统计划于周三抵达北京，与中国领导人习近平举行会晤。虽然开发最有效模型的竞赛不太可能被讨论，但双方可能会谈到驱动人工智能的芯片获取问题或围绕其使用的防护措施。

Previewing the summit Sunday during a call with reporters, a senior U.S. official said A.I. and cybersecurity were high on the agenda with Beijing, noting concerns with “the latest models of A.I.” The official said the United States and China were exploring how to establish better communication over artificial intelligence, creating a “deconfliction” channel in which experts from each country could address the risks of artificial intelligence.

一名美国高级官员周日在与记者的电话会议上预览峰会时表示，人工智能和网络安全是与北京的重点议题，并提到了对“最新人工智能模型”的担忧。该官员称，美国和中国正在探索如何建立更好的人工智能沟通机制，创建一个“冲突化解”渠道，让两国专家能够共同应对人工智能风险。

In April, Anthropic announced a new A.I. model called Mythos. The company said it was withholding it from a public release because it was skilled at finding software vulnerabilities and could cause a cybersecurity reckoning. It made the model available to the U.S. government and more than 40 organizations and companies, so that they could identify and guard against future attacks.

今年4月，Anthropic宣布推出名为Mythos的新人工智能模型。该公司表示，由于该模型擅长发现软件漏洞，可能引发网络安全危机，因此暂不公开发布。它已将该模型提供给美国政府以及40多家组织和公司，以便它们识别并防范未来的攻击。

The technology has set off alarm bells across the world. For rivals like China and Russia, it showed the risks of falling behind in the race to develop powerful artificial intelligence. The systems have the potential to give a nation-state the upper hand in defending against — and spearheading — cyberattacks at a vast scope and scale.

这项技术已在全球范围内敲响警钟。对于中国和俄罗斯等竞争对手来说，这凸显了在开发强大人工智能竞赛中落后的风险。这些系统有可能让某一个民族国家在防御和发动大规模网络攻击方面占据上风。

For years, U.S. officials have estimated that artificial intelligence models developed by the most advanced American firms are around six months ahead of China’s best models.

多年来，美国官员一直估计，美国最先进公司开发的人工智能模型领先中国最佳模型约六个月。

But according to some U.S. government and industry officials, the latest models — OpenAI’s ChatGPT 5.5 as well as Anthropic’s Mythos — have drastically extended the lead, potentially by nine months to a year. Other American officials have been more cautious, noting that China has a track record of catching up quickly.

但根据一些美国政府和行业官员的看法，最新模型——OpenAI的ChatGPT 5.5以及Anthropic的Mythos——已大幅扩大领先优势，可能达到九个月至一年。也有美国官员较为谨慎，指出中国有快速追赶的记录。

Last year, innovations by the Chinese firm DeepSeek showcased the country’s ability to close the A.I. gap. And DeepSeek has said that its new model was adapted to run on chips made by the Chinese tech giant Huawei, further underscoring Beijing’s push to keep pace.

去年，中国公司深度求索(DeepSeek)的创新展示了该国缩小人工智能差距的能力。DeepSeek表示，其新模型已适配中国科技巨头华为制造的芯片，进一步凸显北京追赶的努力。

Still, Chinese analysts have expressed concern over the potential of the new Anthropic model. One organization, IDC China, said that Mythos posed a significant risk to Chinese companies, and that Anthropic’s limits on its reach created a technology gap. Another analyst, highlighting the cybersecurity threat, wrote that China was sharpening swords while the other side rolled out a Gatling gun.

尽管如此，中国分析人士仍对Anthropic新模型的潜力表示担忧。IDC中国表示，Mythos对中国公司构成重大风险，而Anthropic对其使用范围的限制制造了技术差距。另一位分析师在强调网络安全威胁时写道，中国正在磨刀，而对方已经推出了加特林机枪。

Chinese analysts have been particularly worried because they view Anthropic as hostile to China. The start-up is currently embroiled in suits with the Pentagon, which announced it would be removed from American government networks after a dispute over how the technology would be used.

令中国分析人士格外担忧的是，他们认为Anthropic对中国持敌对态度。这家初创公司目前正与五角大楼陷入诉讼，在双方就技术使用方式发生争执后，后者宣布将其从美国政府网络中移除。

But since its founding, Anthropic has geared its business toward U.S. national security customers. It was the first to put its A.I. models on classified American networks, for example, and has long taken pains to keep its technology out of the hands of the Chinese. In September, Anthropic expanded restrictions on its technology to include companies whose ownership structures made them vulnerable to control “from jurisdictions where our products are not permitted, like China, regardless of where they operate.”

但自成立以来，Anthropic一直将业务导向美国国家安全客户。例如，它是首批将人工智能模型部署到美国机密网络的公司之一，并长期努力防止其技术落入中国手中。今年9月，Anthropic扩大了对技术的限制范围，包括那些所有权结构使其容易受到“来自我们产品不被允许的司法管辖区（如中国）控制”的公司，无论它们在哪里运营。

Increasingly, both the Chinese and U.S. governments view their artificial intelligence companies — including those that produce the models and the cloud companies that host the computer networks they run on — as national assets. China blocked a $2 billion acquisition by Meta of the Chinese A.I. company Manus. China has also told some of its A.I. start-ups that they cannot accept American investment without government approval.

中美两国政府越来越多地将本国人工智能公司——包括生产模型的公司和托管其运行计算机网络的云服务公司——视为国家资产。中国阻止了Meta对中资人工智能公司Manus的20亿美元收购。中国还告知部分人工智能初创企业，未经政府批准不得接受美国投资。

Anthropic and OpenAI have restricted access to their latest models to a few companies and U.S. government agencies. Both models have the ability to discover previously unknown vulnerabilities in computer networks.

Anthropic和OpenAI已将其最新模型的访问权限限制在少数公司和美国政府机构。这些模型都具备发现计算机网络中未知漏洞的能力。

Chinese officials have argued that Anthropic and OpenAI have been wrong to keep a close hold on the models, contending that China needs access to them to find vulnerabilities in software, especially to defend its own critical infrastructure.

中国官员辩称，Anthropic和OpenAI严格控制模型的做法是错误的，认为中国需要获取这些模型来发现软件漏洞，尤其是保护自身关键基础设施。

Officials from Anthropic declined to discuss the Chinese request.

Anthropic官员拒绝讨论中方的这一请求。

Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said he was not familiar with the exchange at the Carnegie meeting. But he said China was committed to balancing A.I. development with security.

中国驻华盛顿大使馆发言人刘鹏宇表示，他不了解卡内基会议上的那次交流。但他称，中国致力于平衡人工智能发展与安全。

“China stands ready to strengthen exchanges and cooperation on A.I. with all parties, to foster shared benefits through joint consultation and to work together to create an open, inclusive and mutually beneficial development environment,” he said in a statement.

“中方愿与各方加强人工智能交流与合作，通过共同协商实现互利共赢，共同营造开放、包容、互惠的发展环境，”他在声明中表示。

U.S. officials noted that while a member of a Chinese think tank made the overture, it was all but certain that the Chinese government had approved and directed the message. Beijing typically exercises a strong degree of control over its think tanks, especially when they are engaged in unofficial diplomacy, like that type of exchange, known as a Track 2 dialogue.

美国官员指出，虽然提出请求的是中国智库成员，但几乎可以肯定中国政府批准并指示了这一信息。北京通常对其智库实施高度控制，尤其是在进行像此次交流这样的非官方外交时，这样的外交被称为“二轨”对话。

中国远没有表面上看起来强大，这才是问题所在

Wed, 13 May 2026 06:06:02 +0000

BRET STEPHENS

2026年5月13日

When President Trump visits Beijing this week, he should have the satisfaction of knowing that time, in the long run, is on America’s side. Unfortunately, that’s also the problem.

当特朗普总统本周访问北京时，他理应感到欣慰，因为从长远来看，时间站在美国这一边。不幸的是，这恰恰也是问题所在。

That’s the opposite of a conventional wisdom that holds that the United States is a fumbling status quo power, akin to Britain in the waning years of its empire, squandering its strength in sideshow wars (South Africa then; Iran now) while failing to grapple with its principal strategic and economic competitor (Germany then; China now). It’s this same conventional wisdom that has been telling us that, any year now, China will overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy.

这与一种普遍观点背道而驰——该观点认为，美国是一个步履蹒跚、维持现状的大国，类似于大英帝国衰落时期的样子，在次要战争（当时是南非，现在是伊朗）中虚耗国力，却未能应对主要的战略和经济竞争对手（当时是德国，现在是中国）。正是这种传统观念一直在告诉我们，中国随时都会超越美国，成为世界第一大经济体。

But China’s economy most likely will never overtake America’s, just as past would-be contenders — whether they were the Soviet Union, Japan or the European Union — all fell short. Why? Because history shows that the most productive national assets are political freedom and open markets — the freer, more open and more competitive, the better.

但中国的经济极有可能永远不会超过美国，就像过去那些潜在的竞争者——无论是苏联、日本还是欧盟——最终都未能如愿。为什么？因为历史表明，最高效的国家资产是政治自由和开放市场——越自由、越开放、越具竞争性，就越好。

That’s a point that often gets lost with those who think that good economics means a wise industrial policy, one that steers government revenues into technologies of “the future.” Hence China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, has ordered heavy investment in robotics, electric cars, lithium-ion batteries and military kit, just as Germany’s leaders at the beginning of this century made a titanic push into renewable energy — only to see it founder long before Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine exposed Berlin’s backdoor dependence on cheap Russian gas.

那些认为良好的经济就意味着英明的产业政策，也就是由政府将财政收入引向“未来”技术的人，往往会忽略这一点。因此，中国最高领导人习近平下令在机器人、电动汽车、锂离子电池和军事装备领域进行大规模投资，正如本世纪初德国领导人对可再生能源的大力推动——结果在普京入侵乌克兰暴露出柏林对廉价俄罗斯天然气的隐蔽依赖之前，这一努力就早已陷入失败。

Outside of emergencies, particularly war, such an approach rarely works out well. Technologies of the future often turn out to be anything but. (Remember ethanol-fueled cars as environmental godsends?) Taxpayer funds steered toward so-called national champion industries frequently lead to sloppy practices as corporate leaders become more attuned to political demands — like keeping money-losing factories open — than to tough-minded management. And corruption tends to become endemic whenever the lines between business and government become hopelessly blurred.

除了紧急状态（尤其是战争）之外，这种方法很少取得良好效果。所谓“未来的技术”往往被证明名不副实。（还记得曾被视为环保救星的乙醇燃料汽车吗？）当纳税人的资金被导向所谓的国家冠军产业时，企业领导者往往更关注政治需求——比如维持亏损工厂的运营——而非严谨的管理，这常导致管理松懈。而一旦商业与政府之间的界限变得难以区分，腐败往往就会成为痼疾。

The United States periodically suffers from some of this, not least under the current administration. China’s problems are orders of magnitude worse.

美国周期性地遭受其中一些问题的困扰，在现任政府领导下尤为如此。但中国的问题要严重得多。

As of last year, state-owned or “mixed-ownership” enterprises account for about 60 percent of China’s largest companies. The bursting of China’s real-estate bubble — creating the eerie phenomenon of “ghost cities” — has depleted the savings of millions of ordinary Chinese and helped cause a municipal financing crisis. And China’s corporate sector is increasingly being “zombified” as companies become dependent on cheap credit to cover their losses: “Business debt has doubled since 2019, while revenues are only 30 percent higher,” reports Fortune.

截至去年，国有制或“混合所有制”企业约占中国最大企业的60%。中国房地产泡沫的破裂催生了“鬼城”这一诡异现象，耗尽了数以百万计普通中国人的积蓄，并引发了地方财政危机。而中国的企业部门正日益“僵尸化”，因为公司正日益依赖廉价信贷来弥补亏损：据《财富》杂志报道，“自2019年以来，企业债务翻了一番，而收入仅增长了30%。”

This economic house of cards rests, if you’ll forgive the mixed metaphor, on a foundation of sand: an aging and declining work force, net emigration, widespread youth unemployment, plummeting foreign direct investment, an arbitrary rule of law that terrifies business leaders, repeated purges of the military that project far more paranoia than confidence and a truculent foreign policy that does little more than alarm and alienate China’s neighbors.

请恕我混用隐喻，这座经济纸牌屋是建立在沙子的地基之上：劳动力老龄化且规模萎缩、人口净流出、广泛的青年失业、外商直接投资骤减、让商界领袖胆战心惊的随意执法、暴露出猜疑而非自信的反复军队清洗，以及除了引发邻国惊恐和疏远之外别无他用的强硬外交政策。

Great powers should have a combination of hard and soft power — the power to compel and the power to attract, in Joseph Nye’s famous formulation. What today’s China has is brittle power: power with too much hardness and not enough capacity to bend or adapt. Sooner or later, it is destined to shatter.

根据约瑟夫·奈著名的表述，大国应该兼具硬实力和软实力——也就是强制力和吸引力。而今天的中国拥有的是一种 “脆实力”：这种力量硬度有余，但缺乏弯曲或适应的能力。迟早，它注定会破碎。

That, however, is what makes today’s China so scary. Rising nations, which is what China was under Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, have the luxury of being able to bide their time. Declining nations don’t. It tends to make them more inclined to gamble with their future. It’s why Putin invaded Ukraine after he realized the country was moving inexorably into the West’s orbit. It’s also why Xi will be powerfully tempted to seize Taiwan by invasion or blockade despite the enormous risks it poses not only to the world’s economy but also to his own.

然而，这正是当今中国如此令人恐惧的原因。正在崛起中的国家——邓小平和江泽民时期的中国正是如此——有余裕可以静待时机。衰落的国家则没有。这往往使它们更倾向于拿未来进行豪赌。正因如此，普京在意识到乌克兰正不可避免地进入西方轨道后，决定入侵乌克兰。同样因为如此，习近平会感受到强烈的诱惑，渴望通过入侵或封锁来夺取台湾，尽管此举不仅对世界经济，而且对他自身也构成巨大风险。

What would a wise American policy look like in the face of this kind of challenge? In a sentence, it would be dovish on the terms of trade and hawkish on the defense of our allies.

面对这种挑战，明智的美国政策应该是怎样的？简而言之，就是在贸易条款方面采取鸽派立场，在保卫盟友方面采取鹰派立场。

That’s roughly the opposite of what the administration’s rhetoric and policies have been thus far: a constantly threatened trade war along with decidedly mixed signals on whether the U.S. will continue to supply Taiwan with arms or come to its defense in the event of a conflict. If Trump uses his summit to barter away a pledged $11 billion arms sale to the island in exchange for a variety of diplomatic or economic promises from Beijing — whether the subject is the Strait of Hormuz or the supply of rare earths — you’ll know the summit has been a fiasco.

这与本届政府目前的言论和政策几乎相反：政府一方面不断威胁要发动贸易战，另一方面，在是否继续向台湾提供武器、以及冲突发生时是否提供防御的问题上，释放出明显矛盾的信号。如果特朗普利用这次峰会，将承诺的110亿美元对台军售作为筹码，去换取北京在外交或经济上的各种承诺——无论是霍尔木兹海峡还是稀土供应——那么你就会知道，这次峰会是一场彻底的惨败。

Certain readers will be tempted to remark that, when it comes to repression or corruption, Trump is every bit the match of Xi. If that were true, this column couldn’t be published. What is true, as Bill Clinton put it in his first Inaugural Address, is that “there is nothing wrong with America that cannot be cured by what is right with America” — which goes for this administration. Nothing similar can be said about China’s Communist Party. That is what makes it dangerous to us now and an even greater danger to itself later.

某些读者可能会忍不住指出，在压迫或腐败方面，特朗普与习近平不相上下。如果真是那样，本篇专栏文章就根本无法发表。正如比尔·克林顿在他的第一次就职演说中所说，事实是：“美国的所有问题，都能用美国的优点来纠正”——这同样适用于本届政府。但对于中国共产党，却无法得出类似的结论。正因如此，它在当下对我们构成危险，而在未来却会对自身构成更大的危险。

中国寻求AI技术自主，削弱华盛顿制衡北京筹码

Wed, 13 May 2026 05:36:01 +0000

MEAGHAN TOBIN

2026年5月13日

DeepSeek首次宣布，其新模型已针对中国科技巨头华为生产的芯片进行了优化。 Kelsey McClellan for The New York Times

When the Chinese start-up DeepSeek released its latest artificial intelligence model last month, it edged Beijing closer to a future that it has spent years trying to build.

上个月，中国初创公司DeepSeek发布其最新人工智能模型时，它让北京距离一个多年来一直努力构建的未来又近了一步。

In a small but meaningful break from American technology, DeepSeek said for the first time that its new model had been optimized to run on chips made by the Chinese tech giant Huawei. This was a milestone in China’s long-running effort to develop advanced technologies at home and reduce its reliance on Western innovation.

在与美国技术的一次虽小但意义深远的切割中，DeepSeek首次宣布，其新模型已针对中国科技巨头华为生产的芯片进行了优化。这是中国长期推动先进技术国产化、减少对西方创新依赖的重要里程碑。

While most of the world’s leading A.I. systems still rely on semiconductors from the U.S. chip-making giant Nvidia, Chinese A.I. firms are increasingly turning to homegrown alternatives.

尽管全球大多数领先的人工智能系统仍然依赖美国芯片巨头英伟达的半导体，但中国的人工智能企业正越来越多地转向国产替代方案。

The timing of DeepSeek’s announcement — before this week’s scheduled summit between President Trump and Xi Jinping, China’s leader — gives Beijing fresh confidence entering trade talks that U.S. export controls on Nvidia chips have not derailed China’s A.I. development.

DeepSeek宣布这一消息的时间点——恰好在本周特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平计划举行峰会之前——也让北京在贸易谈判前增添了新的信心，美国对英伟达芯片的出口管制并未阻断中国人工智能的发展进程。

Any meaningful shift by China away from American A.I. technology could limit the impact of U.S. export controls and deprive Washington of a critical source of leverage over Beijing. That prospect gained urgency since DeepSeek’s A.I. technology rattled the U.S. tech industry and turned the company into a potent symbol of China’s drive for technological self-sufficiency.

中国若能在实质意义上减少对美国人工智能技术的依赖，不仅可能削弱美国出口管制的效力，还将令华盛顿失去一张制衡北京的关键筹码。自DeepSeek的人工智能技术令美国科技业为之震动、并成为中国追求科技自给自足象征之后，这种前景变得更加紧迫。

Before last year’s meeting between the two leaders, Mr. Trump said he planned to discuss Nvidia’s most powerful A.I. chips with Mr. Xi, fueling speculation that the United States might ease restrictions on the technology.

在去年两国领导人会晤之前，特朗普曾表示，他计划与习近平讨论英伟达最强大的人工智能芯片，这引发了外界猜测：美国可能会放松对相关技术的限制。

But after years of Washington’s preventing Chinese companies from buying certain advanced technology products, firms like DeepSeek and Moonshot AI are starting to design their A.I. systems around the constraints rather than waiting for them to disappear. That includes exploring how their models can run on a broader range of processors beyond Nvidia’s.

但在华盛顿多年来阻止中国企业购买某些先进技术产品之后，DeepSeek、月之暗面等公司已开始围绕这些限制来重新设计人工智能系统，而非坐等限制解除。这包括探索如何让模型在英伟达之外更多种类的处理器上运行。

“U.S. export controls are not freezing China’s A.I. development,” said Wei Sun, a principal A.I. analyst at Counterpoint Research in Beijing. “They are forcing China to build an alternative stack.”

“美国的出口管制并没有冻结中国的人工智能发展，”北京Counterpoint Research的人工智能首席分析师孙薇表示。“它们正在迫使中国建立一套替代性的技术栈。”

在DeepSeek发布最新模型时，华为表示，双方实现了“芯模技术紧密协同”。

DeepSeek has said its latest model can use Huawei chips for inference, the process that allows an A.I. system to respond more quickly and accurately to users. Inference generally requires less computing power than training, the demanding process of teaching a model how to function. DeepSeek still relied on Nvidia chips to train its system, according to two people in the semiconductor industry who were not authorized to comment publicly on the matter.

DeepSeek表示，其最新模型可以使用华为芯片进行推理，即让人工智能系统能够更快速、更准确地回应用户的过程。相比训练——即教会模型如何运作这一高强度计算过程——推理通常需要更少的算力。据两位不便公开发表意见的半导体业内人士透露，DeepSeek在训练系统时仍然依赖英伟达芯片。

It was not immediately clear how DeepSeek gained access to those chips, though Chinese companies can still remotely use Nvidia chips housed in data centers outside China. DeepSeek did not respond to a request for comment.

目前尚不清楚DeepSeek是如何获得这些芯片的，不过中国企业仍然可以远程使用部署在中国境外数据中心里的英伟达芯片。DeepSeek未回应置评请求。

Huawei has said it plans to release a chip for training this year. But it also said it would take another year after that before its products could match the performance of Nvidia’s current offerings.

华为表示，计划在今年推出一款用于训练的芯片。但它同时也表示，其产品要达到英伟达现有产品的性能水平，还需再等一年。

The growing split between Chinese and American A.I. infrastructure is a consequence that Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s chief executive, has long warned would result from rigid export controls.

中美人工智能基础设施之间日益分裂的局面正是英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋长期以来警告出口管制可能导致的后果。

He has said the restrictions have only pushed Chinese companies to accelerate efforts to build domestic alternatives, which could lead to a bifurcated market: Chinese A.I. systems running on Chinese chips while the West sticks with American hardware.

他曾表示，这些限制只会促使中国企业加快研发国内替代方案，最终可能导致市场一分为二：中国人工智能系统运行在中国芯片之上，西方则继续使用美国硬件。

As the world’s dominant maker of A.I. chips, Nvidia stands to gain from unfettered access to China. But Mr. Huang has argued that the strict restrictions will ultimately hurt the United States by diminishing its influence over China’s A.I. industry.

作为全球人工智能芯片的主导制造商，英伟达本可以从不受限制地进入中国市场中获得好处。但黄仁勋认为，严格的限制最终将削弱美国对中国人工智能产业的影响力，从而损害美国自身利益。

Two months after his last meeting with Mr. Xi, Mr. Trump granted Nvidia permission to sell the H200, one of its most powerful chips, to China.

与习近平上次会面两个月后，特朗普批准英伟达向中国出售H200——其最强大的芯片之一。

But since then, those chips have been squeezed between lawmakers in Washington, who are seeking closer oversight of their use in China, and Beijing, which has directed Chinese tech companies to buy domestic chips.

但自那以后，这些芯片一直受困于两方面的压力：一方面是华盛顿的立法者，他们要求更严格地监督这些芯片在中国的使用；另一方面是北京，它已指示中国科技公司采购国产芯片。

英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋表示，严格的出口管制已促使中国企业加速打造本土替代方案。

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick told a Senate Appropriations Committee last month that no H200s had actually gone to China, and Nvidia said in regulatory filings this year that it had yet to generate any revenue from H200 sales there. Ahead of this week’s summit in Beijing, the fate of Nvidia’s chips in China is no clearer than it was at the last meeting between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi.

商务部长霍华德·卢特尼克上月在参议院拨款委员会作证时表示，实际上并无H200芯片运抵中国；英伟达在今年提交的监管文件中也表示，尚未从对华销售H200中产生任何收入。在本周北京峰会前夕，英伟达芯片在中国的命运并不比特朗普与习近平上次会面时更加明朗。

Analysts expect that China’s frustration with U.S. export controls will be part of the discussion when the two leaders meet.

分析人士预计，中国对美国出口管制的不满情绪将成为两国领导人会谈议题的一部分。

“Chip export controls have consistently been an issue China opposes,” said Jiang Tianjiao, an associate professor at Fudan University in Shanghai. But as China’s chip-making abilities improve, officials may not want to interfere with efforts to reduce its dependence on American technologies, he said.

“芯片出口管制一直是中国反对的问题，”上海复旦大学副教授江天骄说。但他表示，随着中国芯片制造能力的不断提升，官员们或许并不想干预中国减少对美国技术依赖的努力。

While Chinese technology companies have continued to release high-performing A.I. systems despite export controls, China’s push for technological self-sufficiency in chip manufacturing still faces significant hurdles. Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, or SMIC, the Chinese company making some Huawei chips, has struggled to produce them at scale. The chips it manufactures are more prone to defects and consume more power than those made by foreign rivals.

尽管在出口管制下，中国科技公司仍在持续发布高性能的人工智能系统，但中国在芯片制造领域追求技术自给自足的努力仍面临重大障碍。生产部分华为芯片的中芯国际在大规模量产方面一直面临困难，其生产的芯片良品率较低、能耗也高于外国竞争对手。

Huawei’s workaround has been to strap together large numbers of these weaker chips to achieve the computing power of more advanced processors — a strategy that depends on SMIC’s being able to manufacture in large volumes. Yet Chinese chipmakers are still expected to produce only a small fraction of the advanced semiconductors made by foreign companies like Nvidia this year.

华为的应对办法是将大量性能较弱的芯片捆绑在一起，以达到更先进处理器的算力——这一策略有赖于中芯国际实现大规模量产。然而，中国芯片制造商今年预计生产的先进半导体仍只是英伟达等外国企业产量的极小一部分。

Before Washington tightened controls, many of Huawei’s chips were made by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which produces most of the world’s advanced chips, including Nvidia’s.

在华盛顿收紧管制之前，华为的许多芯片由台积电制造。台积电生产全球大部分先进芯片，包括英伟达的芯片。

Export controls have constrained China’s ability to make the large volumes of advanced chips needed for A.I., said Dan Kim, chief strategy officer at TechInsights, a Canadian research firm, and a Commerce Department official during the Biden administration. But he added that those same restrictions had also pushed Chinese tech companies to innovate in new ways.

加拿大研究机构TechInsights首席战略官、拜登政府时期商务部官员丹·金表示，出口管制限制了中国制造大规模先进人工智能芯片的能力。但他同时也指出，这些限制也推动中国科技公司以新的方式进行创新。

Chinese companies are trying to redefine what determines success in the race to build cutting-edge A.I. For years, the industry’s most advanced systems have come from companies that can afford to spend billions of dollars assembling vast numbers of powerful chips.

中国企业正试图重新定义人工智能竞赛的成功标准。多年来，行业内最先进的系统，都出自那些能够投入数十亿美元、组建庞大高性能芯片集群的公司。

Now, companies like Huawei are betting that success could someday depend less on amassing the most computing power and more on building an integrated ecosystem of chips, A.I. models and applications that is good enough for most real-world uses. By working closely with A.I. model developers like DeepSeek, Huawei can customize its hardware to better support the software running on it.

如今，华为等公司押注于另一种可能：未来的成功或许不再主要取决于谁拥有最多的计算能力，而是取决于谁能建立一个足够好、能够满足大多数现实应用需求的芯片、人工智能模型与应用程序的一体化生态系统。通过与DeepSeek这样的人工智能模型开发商紧密合作，华为可以对硬件进行定制化调整，以更好地支持在其上运行的软件。

When DeepSeek announced its latest model, Huawei said there had been “close collaboration of chip and model technologies from both parties.”

在DeepSeek发布最新模型时，华为表示，双方实现了“芯模技术紧密协同”。

In technical papers describing its models, DeepSeek outlined specific ways chip makers could modify their products to improve performance with its systems.

在描述其模型的技术论文中，DeepSeek详细阐述了芯片制造商可以如何改进产品，以提升与其系统的适配性能。

“DeepSeek is calling out into the void to Huawei and other companies, ‘Please make these changes so we can get better performance out of your chips,’” said Jacob Feldgoise, an analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University.

乔治城大学安全与新兴技术中心分析师雅各布·费尔德戈斯说，“DeepSeek是在向华为和其他公司喊话：‘请做出这些修改，这样我们就能从你们的芯片中获得更好的性能。”

加州阿卡迪亚市市长对充当中国代理人指控认罪

Wed, 13 May 2026 02:36:02 +0000

POOJA SALHOTRA

2026年5月13日

Eileen Wang, the mayor of Arcadia, Calif., resigned on Monday after federal prosecutors announced they had charged her with acting as an illegal agent of the Chinese government. She will plead guilty to the charge, according to a plea deal unsealed the same day.

加州阿卡迪亚市市长王爱琳(Eileen Wang)周一辞职，此前联邦检察官宣布对她提出指控，称她作为中国政府的非法代理人行事。根据同一天公开的认罪协议，她将对这项指控认罪。

The felony charge comes with a potential sentence of up to 10 years in prison.

这项重罪指控最高可判处10年监禁。

The court document outlined Ms. Wang’s efforts, beginning in late 2020 and continuing until at least the end of 2022, to operate a purported news website called U.S. News Center that circulated pro-China content at the direction of Chinese government officials. Ms. Wang covertly worked with a man in Southern California named Mike Sun, a Chinese national, to disseminate the information.

法庭文件详细描述了王爱琳从2020年底开始、至少持续到2022年底的行为：她运营一个声称为新闻网站的“U.S. News Center”，在中国政府官员的指示下传播亲中国内容。她秘密与身在南加州的中国公民孙耀宁合作，散布这些信息。

Mr. Sun, who is also known as Yaoning Sun, was sentenced in February to four years in prison for his role in the operation. He was previously engaged to Ms. Wang and had worked on her election campaign as the treasurer, according to public records. Ms. Wang, 58, was elected in November 2022 to the Arcadia City Council, and the mayor is selected from the five-person council on a rotating basis.

孙耀宁于今年2月被判刑，因参与该行动被判处四年监禁。他曾是王爱琳的未婚夫，根据公开记录，他还担任过她竞选活动的财务主管。王爱琳现年58岁，于2022年11月当选阿卡迪亚市议会议员，市长一职由五人议会成员轮流担任。

“Individuals in our country who covertly do the bidding of foreign governments undermine our democracy,” Bill Essayli, the first assistant U.S. attorney for the Central District of California, said in a statement. “This plea agreement is the latest success in our determination to defend the homeland against China’s efforts to corrupt our institutions.”

美国加州中区第一助理检察官比尔·埃塞利在声明中表示：“在我们国家，暗中为外国政府效劳的人会破坏我们的民主。这份认罪协议是我们决心保卫家园、抵御中国对我们的制度腐蚀的最新成果。”

The Chinese government has exerted influence over local elections across the United States to advance its interests, targeting the Chinese American community in particular. In some cases, federal investigators have arrested the leaders of covert operations.

中国政府一直试图影响美国各地的地方选举以推进自身利益，尤其针对华裔美国人社区。在某些案件中，联邦调查人员逮捕了秘密行动的领导人。

According to the plea agreement, Ms. Wang posted propaganda directed to a Chinese American audience. In one example, Ms. Wang was told through an encrypted message to publish an essay “explaining China’s stance on the Xinjiang issue — there is no genocide in Xinjiang; there is no such thing as ‘forced labor’ in any production activity, including cotton production,” the message read. “Spreading such rumor is to defame China, destroy Xinjiang’s safety and stability, weaken local economy, suppress China’s development.”

根据认罪协议，王爱琳发布了针对华裔美国受众的宣传内容。其中一个例子是，有人通过加密消息指示她发布一篇文章，“解释中国在新疆问题上的立场——新疆没有种族灭绝；任何生产活动，包括棉花生产，都不存在‘强迫劳动’。”消息称：“散布此类谣言是为了诽谤中国，破坏新疆的安全稳定，削弱当地经济，压制中国的发展。”

A few minutes later, Ms. Wang posted the article. Over the next couple of months, she made tweaks to the article at the direction of a Chinese government leader.

几分钟后，王爱琳就发布了该文章。在接下来的几个月里，她按照中国政府领导人的指示对文章进行了修改。

In another instance cited in the court documents, she sent a pro-China article from her site to Mr. Sun and asked him to help distribute it. In a message, she told him, “This is what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to send.”

法庭文件引述的另一个例子是，她将自己网站上的一篇亲中文章发给孙耀宁，并要求他帮助传播。她在消息中告诉他：“这是外交部想要发出的内容。”

In a statement, Ms. Wang’s lawyers, Brian A. Sun and Jason Liang, said she “recognized the seriousness of this charge and has agreed to accept responsibility for her past mistakes.” The statement emphasized that her misconduct was carried out in her personal capacity, not in her position as an elected official. Brian Sun is not related to Mike Sun.

王爱琳的律师布莱恩·A·孙（音）和杰森·梁（音）在一份声明中表示，她“认识到这项指控的严重性，并同意为过去的错误承担责任”。声明强调，她的违规行为是以个人身份实施的，并非以当选官员的身份。布莱恩·孙与孙耀宁没有亲属关系。

When Mike Sun was charged and sentenced, he was accused of helping a politician he considered friendly to Chinese interests win a seat on the City Council. The population of Arcadia, in Los Angeles County, is about 59 percent Asian American, according to census data.

在被起诉和判刑时，孙耀宁被指控帮助一名他认为对中国利益友好的政治人物赢得市议会席位。根据人口普查数据，洛杉矶县的阿卡迪亚市约59%的人口为亚裔美国人。

Prosecutors did not name Ms. Wang in the documents charging Mr. Sun, but other details in those court documents pointed to her as the council member who was discussed.

检察官在起诉孙耀宁的文件中并未点名王爱琳，但这些法庭文件的其他细节指向她就是所涉议员。

Ms. Wang tried to distance herself from Mr. Sun in the months since he was sent to prison, but she faced increasing pressure to resign.

自孙耀宁入狱以来，王爱琳试图与他保持距离，但她面临越来越大的辞职压力。

Another man, John Chen, who prosecutors said served as a go-between for Mr. Sun and the Chinese government, was sentenced in 2024 to 20 months in prison for acting as an illegal foreign agent.

另一名男子约翰·陈（音）被检察官指为孙耀宁与中国政府之间的中间人，于2024年因担任非法外国代理人被判处20个月监禁。

The Arcadia City Council will select a new mayor during its next meeting, the city manager, Dominic Lazzaretto, said in a statement.

阿卡迪亚市城市经理多米尼克·拉扎雷托在声明中表示，市议会将在下一次会议上选出新市长。

“The allegations at the center of this case — that a foreign government sought to exert influence over a local elected official — are deeply troubling,” Mr. Lazzaretto said. He added that no city finances or staff members were involved, according to an internal review.

拉扎雷托说：“本案核心的指控——外国政府试图对地方民选官员施加影响——令人深感不安。”他补充说，根据内部审查，市政府的资金或工作人员均未参与其中。

“习特会”前瞻：中美各有难题，会谈预期降低

Wed, 13 May 2026 02:36:02 +0000

DAVID E. SANGER

2026年5月13日

去年，特朗普总统在韩国釜山会见中国国家主席习近平。两位领导人本周将在北京再次会晤。 Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

This is not how President Trump wanted to arrive in China.

特朗普总统本不想在这样的局势下前往中国。

When he delayed his long-awaited trip to Beijing by six weeks, Mr. Trump was betting he would arrive in Beijing this week having forced the Iranians to capitulate to his demands. He anticipated that by now the shattered Iranian leadership would have agreed to turn over its nuclear stockpile, forgo its atomic ambitions and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The message to President Xi Jinping would have been clear: Chinese declarations of a superpower in decline were premature.

当他将期待已久的北京之行推迟六周时，特朗普原本赌的是，本周他抵达北京时，自己已经成功迫使伊朗人屈服于他的要求。他料想到这个时候，遭受重创的伊朗领导层会同意交出核材料储备、放弃核野心，并重新开放霍尔木兹海峡。向习近平主席传递的信息将是明确无误的：中国所谓美国这个超级大国正在衰落的论断，为时过早。

Instead, Mr. Trump will arrive on Wednesday with many in China wondering how he got bogged down by a far lesser power in a war he started. Iran’s nuclear stockpile is exactly where it was, still under the rubble of an American bombing raid last June. The Strait of Hormuz, through which China gets more than 30 percent of its oil and a bit less of its natural gas, remains closed, with no obvious plan to pry it open again.

然而，当特朗普周三抵达北京时，许多中国人都在疑惑：他怎么会在一场自己发起的战争中被一个远不如美国强大的对手搞得进退两难。伊朗的核材料储备分毫未动，依然深埋在去年6月美军轰炸留下的废墟之下。霍尔木兹海峡依然封锁，而且没有明确的重开计划，而中国超过30%的石油和相当比例的天然气都要经过这里。

But the war is also tricky for Mr. Xi. For all of China’s global ambitions, he has been unable and unwilling to come to the aid of Iran, a political partner and key supplier, and has offered no plan of his own to resume the vital flow of China-bound oil and gas.

然而，这场战争对习近平来说同样棘手。尽管中国野心勃勃、志在全球，他却既没有能力、也无意出手援助伊朗——中国的政治伙伴与重要能源供应国。而且对于如何恢复这条向中国输送石油和天然气的重要通道，他也没有拿出自己的任何方案。

The result is that this is a summit like few others. The world’s two major superpowers, eager to demonstrate their dominance, are both bogged down and uncertain about how the Iran conflict will play out in the context of their struggle for military, economic and technological dominance.

结果就是，这成为了一场前所未有的峰会。世界两大超级大国都急于展示自身主导地位，却同时陷入困境，对伊朗冲突将如何在双方争夺军事、经济与技术主导地位的大背景下收场，都没有把握。

The result is that the ambitions for this summit have been greatly scaled back. The honor guards and celebrations will remain intact, and Mr. Trump is bringing a dozen or so of America’s most powerful business executives with him, from Elon Musk of Tesla and SpaceX to Tim Cook, the soon-to-retire chief executive of Apple, to the top executives of Citi, BlackRock, Blackstone, Boeing and Goldman Sachs.

因此，对此次峰会的期望已大幅降低。仪仗队和迎宾仪式将照常进行，特朗普还带来了十几位美国最具影响力的商界领袖，从特斯拉和SpaceX的埃隆·马斯克，到即将退休的苹果公司首席执行官蒂姆·库克，以及花旗集团、贝莱德、黑石、波音和高盛的高管。

But the early hopes that Mr. Trump will finally begin to address the larger issues that threaten to drive the two nations into a new Cold War competition are quickly fading. The Iran war has been so all-consuming at the White House that, beyond trade and other economic issues, very little has been prepared in advance.

早先人们还期待特朗普能着手解决那些可能将两国推向新冷战竞争的重大问题，但这种希望正在迅速消散。伊朗战争让白宫几乎无暇他顾，以至于除了贸易和其他经济议题外，其他方面几乎没做多少事先准备。

The chief negotiator with China leading up to the trip here has been Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, evidence of how central Mr. Trump regards the bilateral trade and economic relationship. But turning to the Treasury secretary to take the lead would have been unthinkable in most previous administrations, where the secretary of state and the national security adviser — both jobs currently held by Marco Rubio — would insist on purview over the entirety of the complex relationship.

在此次访华前，主导对华谈判的是财政部长斯科特·贝森特，这足以证明特朗普多么重视双边贸易与经济关系。然而，让财政部长来牵头在以往的大多数政府中都是不可想象的，国务卿和国家安全顾问通常会坚持对这一复杂关系的全盘主导权，而这两个职位目前均由马可·鲁比奥一人兼任。

在峰会前的谈判中，国务卿鲁比奥退居次要位置，而财政部长贝森特则处于主导地位——这种做法在美国过去的大多数政府中几乎是不可想象的。

“For the first time since Kissinger,” R. Nicholas Burns, a longtime American diplomat who was ambassador to China under President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “the secretary of state and national security adviser are not driving the relationship with China.” (Kissinger also held both jobs.)

“自基辛格以来，这是国务卿和国家安全顾问首次不再主导对华关系，”曾在拜登政府担任驻华大使的资深外交官尼古拉斯·伯恩斯说。（基辛格当年也曾同时兼任这两个职务。）

That may reflect Mr. Trump’s own shifts on China after he came to office for a second term. He ran as a China hawk, denouncing its trade practices and accusing it of stealing American jobs and intellectual property. His first national security strategy, published in 2017, described China and Russia together as challenging “American power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” His second, in 2025, described them as potential partners.

这或许反映了特朗普进入第二任期后自身对华立场的转变。他以对华强硬姿态参选，抨击中国的贸易行为，指责其窃取美国就业岗位和知识产权。他在2017年发布的首份国家安全战略中，将中国和俄罗斯并列为挑战“美国实力、影响力和利益”，试图“削弱美国的安全与繁荣”的威胁。而到了2025年的第二份国家安全战略中，他将两国称为潜在伙伴。

That shift will likely be on display this week. Administration officials concede that their Chinese counterparts have refused to talk about their remarkably rapid nuclear weapons expansion, much less the new arms control debates swirling around artificial intelligence. Early hopes for a broad trade framework that gets at the critical issues tearing at their relationship — who controls supply chains, and what kind of investments each nation is willing to tolerate in the other — may get short shrift.

这一转变很可能在本周有所体现。政府官员承认，中方已拒绝就其核武器的惊人扩张速度展开讨论，更遑论围绕人工智能展开的新一轮军备控制辩论。早先那种希望达成一个广泛贸易框架、以触及那些正在撕裂两国关系的核心问题——谁控制供应链，以及各自允许对方何种类型的投资——的期待，如今可能也会被轻描淡写地带过。

Mr. Rubio will be along. And so will Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, an unusual, apparently last-minute participant.

鲁比奥将随行，还有国防部长皮特·海格塞斯，他的加入颇为出人意料，似乎是最后关头才定下来的。

Of course, there will be announcements on sales of billions of dollars in American soybeans, which the Chinese need to buy anyway, and doubtless billions in Boeing airplanes and parts. Mr. Xi learned early that the key to dealing productively with Mr. Trump is to start with a full order book for American goods, all the more important because the American trade deficit with China has continued to surge, propelled by China’s overproduction of manufactured goods, which has prompted deflation in Beijing.

当然，届时自然少不了大笔美国大豆销售合同的宣布——中国本就需要购买，再加上数十亿美元的波音飞机及零部件订单。习近平早已摸清了与特朗普打交道的窍门：开局先拿出一份满满当当的美国商品采购清单，这一点尤为重要，因为美国对华贸易逆差仍在持续扩大，而推动这一趋势的是中国制造业的产能过剩，这也导致北京面临通货紧缩压力

As in Mr. Trump’s first term, the rest of the conversation is still something of a mystery, with much left to the private meetings between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi. Robert Hormats, who helped prepare for some of Kissinger’s first meetings with the Chinese, noted this week that “most of a summit’s outcome should be embedded in the draft communiqué, meticulously crafted by senior advisers and pre-agreed by the two leaders.” The purpose was to “leave no room for misunderstandings or differing characterizations between the two sides in the aftermath.”

如同特朗普第一个任期一样，会谈的其余内容仍然是个谜，很大程度上将留待特朗普与习近平之间的私下会谈决定。曾协助筹备基辛格与中方早期部分会晤的罗伯特·霍马茨本周指出，“峰会的大部分成果应嵌入公报草案中，由高级顾问精心起草并经两国领导人预先确认。”这样做的目的是为了“不给事后双方之间出现误解或各执一词留有任何余地”。

At the end of this week, White House officials say, there may be no communiqué at all. Aside from trade and tariffs, which are likely to dominate the summit, here is a look at some of the most contentious issues:

而白宫官员表示，到本周结束时，甚至可能根本不会有任何联合公报。除了几乎肯定将主导峰会的贸易和关税问题之外，以下是一些最具争议的议题：

A Growing Nuclear Arsenal

持续扩张的核武库

When the last remaining major nuclear arms control agreement, New START, expired between the United States and Russia in February, Mr. Trump said it made sense to negotiate a new treaty only if China — which now has the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, and the fastest-growing — was a party to a new accord. In January, in an interview with The New York Times, he said that he planned to bring that up with Mr. Xi, and that the Chinese were open to the idea.

今年2月，美俄之间最后一项主要核军控条约《新削减战略武器条约》到期。特朗普表示，除非拥有全球第三大核武库、且核力量增速最快的中国也加入新协议，否则没必要谈判缔结新条约。今年1月，特朗普在接受《纽约时报》采访时称，计划就此与习近平进行讨论，还表示中方对此持开放态度。

They are not. White House officials say that in the lead-up to the summit, China’s private position was the same as its public one: There is no reason to enter negotiations with Washington and Moscow until Beijing has an arsenal comparable to those of the two other powers. The United States and Russia each have about 1,550 weapons deployed, the limit under New START, but with the treaty’s expiration, they are both free to expand those numbers. According to the Pentagon’s public estimates, China has around 600 weapons, a number expected to rise to 1,000 by 2030 and ultimately to 1,500.

但事实并非如此。白宫官员透露，峰会前夕，中方私下立场与公开表态一致：在中国核武库规模达到与与另外两个核大国比肩之前，没有理由与华盛顿和莫斯科展开谈判。美俄各自部署核弹头约1550枚，这是《新削减战略武器条约》规定的上限；条约失效后，两国均可无限制扩大这一数字。据五角大楼公开估算，中国现有核弹头约600枚，预计2030年增至1000枚，最终将达到1500枚。

Mr. Trump is likely to raise the topic, one of his senior aides told reporters on Sunday. But don’t expect Mr. Xi to say much.

特朗普一名高级助手周日向记者透露，特朗普很可能在会晤中提及这一话题，但不要指望习近平会多说什么。

Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence

网络安全与人工智能

Eleven years ago, President Barack Obama and Mr. Xi stood in the Rose Garden of the White House and described what amounted to a first accord between the two countries on limiting state-sponsored cyberattacks. “Confrontation will lead to losses on both sides,” Mr. Xi said.

11年前，奥巴马总统与习近平在白宫玫瑰园阐述了中美首次就限制国家主导网络攻击达成的共识。习近平当时表示：“对抗只会两败俱伤。”

2015年，奥巴马总统与习近平在白宫共同宣布了一项关于限制国家支持的网络攻击的协议，但该协议最终未能奏效。

The impetus had been the theft of more than 20 million sensitive personnel records from the Office of Personnel Management. Yet the accord was already unraveling within two years, as China turned to outside contractors to conduct the attacks, and reserved the most sensitive operations for its Ministry of State Security.

促成这一共识的起因是美国人事管理办公室超2000万份敏感人事档案遭网络窃取。然而短短两年内，这份共识便开始瓦解：中方转而委托外部机构实施网络攻击，同时将最高敏感度的网络行动交由国家安全部负责。

In recent times, China has embedded itself into American networks with two very different kinds of cyberintrusions. One is apparently aimed at shutting down American power grids and water supplies in case of a conflict over Taiwan, another at sophisticated espionage that bored deep into the Justice Department’s secret systems, among others.

近年来，中国通过两种截然不同的网络入侵方式渗透美国网络体系。第一种的目的是在台海爆发冲突时，用于关停美国电网与供水系统；第二种方式是针对司法部等机构机密系统的精密间谍活动。

Now the artificial intelligence competition between China and the United States is making the cybersecurity problem even harder. If there is any technological development that should prompt both leaders to tackle this issue, it is the sudden shock of Mythos, the Anthropic model that has not been released to the public because it is expert at finding vulnerabilities in the computer code in a matter of milliseconds, speeding up hacking. That is a deeper threat to the systems that control everything from electric grids to missile targeting systems.

如今，中美人工智能领域的竞争使网络安全问题变得更加棘手。如果说有什么技术进展能促使两国领导人着手解决这一问题，那就是Mythos带来的突如其来的冲击——这款由Anthropic公司研发的模型尚未对外公开，它能在毫秒级时间内找出计算机代码漏洞、大幅加速黑客攻击，对电网、导弹制导系统等一切设施的控制系统构成深层威胁。

Mr. Trump is considering an executive order that would require all such new models to undergo a government review before they are released, a reversal of the administration’s approach so far. But American experts believe a Chinese equivalent may only be months away, and the only arms control that might work in this arena is one in which the two countries work together.

特朗普正考虑签署行政令，要求所有此类新型人工智能模型发布前必须接受政府审查，这与本届政府迄今为止的做法截然相反。但美国专家认为，中国同类模型可能数月内就会问世；在这一领域，唯一可行的军控方式唯有两国携手合作。

So far the only agreement in recent times on artificial intelligence came between Mr. Biden and Mr. Xi, who agreed in 2024 not to allow A.I. products to control nuclear weapons. And that basic, common-sense accord took months.

迄今为止，双方近期唯一一份人工智能相关协议是拜登与习近平达成的：双方同意在2024年前不允许人工智能产品控制核武器。就连这样一份基础的常识性共识也耗时数月才敲定。

Taiwan

台湾问题

The White House says to expect no significant changes on Washington’s policy toward Taiwan, dismissing talk that Mr. Trump might be persuaded by Mr. Xi to be more explicit in opposing Taiwanese independence.

白宫表示，华盛顿对台政策不会有重大变化，并驳斥了有关特朗普可能被习近平说服、在反对台湾独立问题上更明确表态的说法。

Chinese officials have been urging Mr. Trump to change the wording American officials use, from saying that the United States “does not support” Taiwan independence to actively “opposing” it.

中方官员一直敦促美方修改官方措辞，从目前的“不支持”台湾独立，转变为明确“反对”台湾独立。

It is unlikely that change will happen, at least in any formal way. But Mr. Xi may be counting on Mr. Trump using informal language to speak about a subject in which every word is parsed and measured. Looming over the discussions: what would happen to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which makes most of the chips that go into building A.I. models and that power the iPhone and countless American weapons systems.

这种表述的改变不太可能发生，至少在正式场合不会。但习近平或许寄希望于特朗普以非正式口吻来谈及这一每个字都会被仔细解读和衡量的话题。笼罩在此次会谈之上的一大问题是台积电将会面临什么，这家公司生产用于构建人工智能模型的大部分芯片，并为iPhone和无数美国武器系统提供动力。

Supply Chains

供应链

Past generations of diplomats who dealt with China struggled with questions like how a non-market economy could integrate with a market one. Now the question is how to deal with two countries that believe they are overdependent on each other.

过去几代与中国打交道的外交官纠结的是市场经济与非市场经济如何融合这类问题。如今的难题则是如何应对彼此都认为过度依赖对方的两个国家。

Mr. Trump’s administration is intensifying a drive to hunt down and replace every source of Chinese supply for critical American systems, particularly weapons. That means building new sources of everything from rare earth processing to the manufacturing of many kinds of semiconductors.

特朗普政府正加紧行动，排查并替换美国关键系统的所有中国供应链来源，尤其是军工领域。这意味着从稀土加工到各类半导体制造，所有领域都需要建立新的供应来源。

China is doing the same, seeking to wean itself from relying on U.S. technology. And while the two sides insist they are seeking to “de-risk” rather than “decouple” their economies, these projects are clearly intended to prepare for a day when the two nations are in a deep Cold War, or a hot one. Washington’s limits on sending the fastest semiconductors to China, and Beijing’s on rare earths mined chiefly in China, could be just a start.

中国也在采取同样的举措，力求摆脱对美国技术的依赖。尽管双方都坚称目标旨在“去风险”而非“脱钩”，但这些布局显然是在为未来两国可能爆发的深度冷战乃至热战做准备。华盛顿限制向中国出口最先进的半导体，北京对主要产自中国的稀土实施限制，这或许只是开端。

But presidents do not usually talk supply chains. And that is unlikely to change.

不过，各国领导人通常不会深入探讨供应链问题，此次峰会大概率也不会例外。

“Gone is any pretense of solving the major structural issues at the heart of the world’s most important bilateral relationship: China’s mercantilist economic model, its designs on absorbing Taiwan and its active support of U.S. adversaries such as Iran and Russia,” Michael Froman, the U.S. trade representative during Mr. Obama’s second term, wrote last week. “As such, the summit is unlikely to alter the character and course of the U.S.-China relationship long-term. It is about managing for stability, not solving outstanding concerns.”

“已经没有人假装要去解决这个世界最重要双边关系的核心重大结构性问题：中国重商主义的经济模式、它谋求吞并台湾的意图，以及对伊朗和俄罗斯等美国对手的积极支持，”奥巴马第二任期的美国贸易代表迈克尔·弗罗曼上周撰文表示。“因此，本次峰会不太可能从根本上改变中美关系的性质与走向，其意义只在于维护稳定，而非解决悬而未决的关切。”

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中国愈发将特朗普治下的美国视为一个衰落的帝国

Wed, 13 May 2026 00:36:32 +0000

袁莉

2026年5月13日

中国天津港。面对特朗普总统的关税，中国在全球舞台上变得愈发坚定自信。 The New York Times

When President Trump visited China in late 2017, Xi Jinping welcomed him with a grand display of Chinese history and culture: a four-hour private tour of the Forbidden City culminating in a performance by the Peking Opera.

2017年末特朗普总统访华时，习近平以一场盛大的中国历史与文化展示欢迎他：四小时的故宫私人参观，最后以一场京剧表演收尾。

Eight years, a pandemic and two trade wars later, Mr. Trump is returning to Beijing, where the theme of future dominance, not ancient majesty, has filled domestic and international headlines with articles about dancing robots, drone swarms and the quiet hum of electric vehicles.

八年之后，经过一场疫情和两场贸易战，特朗普再次回到北京。此时，主导新闻头条的已不再是古代的辉煌，而是关于未来主导权的主题——跳舞的机器人、无人机蜂群，以及电动汽车安静的嗡鸣声。

China increasingly casts itself not as a fading civilization trying to catch up to the West but as a superpower poised to surpass it. Chinese nationalists and state-linked commentators say they have Mr. Trump to thank. America under his rule, they say, validates Mr. Xi’s worldview centered on “the rise of the East and decline of the West.”

中国越来越不把自己描绘成一个试图追赶西方的衰落文明，而是定位为一个即将超越西方的超级大国。中国民族主义者和有官方背景的评论人士表示，他们要感谢特朗普。他们认为，在特朗普治下的美国印证了习近平以“东升西降”为核心的世界观。

For decades, many Chinese viewed the United States with a mix of admiration, envy and resentment. America represented wealth, technological sophistication and institutional confidence. Even critics of Washington who reviled the American system often assumed that it worked.

几十年来，许多中国人以一种钦佩、羡慕和怨恨交织的心情看待美国。美国代表着富有、技术先进和制度自信。即使是批评华盛顿的人，在痛斥美国体制的同时，也往往认为它行之有效。

Mr. Trump’s ascent and his volatile second term shattered that image.

特朗普的崛起及其动荡的第二任期打破了这一形象。

In January, a nationalistic Beijing think tank affiliated with Renmin University published a triumphant report about Mr. Trump’s first year back in office. The report argued that his tariffs, attacks on allies, anti-immigration policies and assaults on the American political establishment had inadvertently strengthened China while weakening the United States. Its title: “Thank Trump.”

今年1月，一家隶属于中国人民大学的民族主义智库就特朗普再度执政的第一年发表了一份得意洋洋的报告。报告认为，他的关税、对盟友的攻击、反移民政策以及对美国政治建制的冲击在无意中增强了中国，同时削弱了美国。报告标题是：《“感谢”特朗普》。

The report called Mr. Trump an “accelerator of American political decay,” with the United States sliding toward polarization, institutional dysfunction and even “Latin American-style instability.” His hostility toward China, the authors argued, was a “reverse booster” that unified the country and helped bring about its strategic self-reliance.

报告称特朗普是“美国政治衰朽的加速器”，美国正滑向两极化、制度失能，甚至“‘拉美化’动荡”。作者认为，他对中国的敌意反而成了“反向助推器”，让中国团结起来，并推动了战略自立。

“At this turning point in history,” the authors wrote, “what we hear is the heavy and haunting toll of an empire’s evening bell.”

“在历史的转弯处，”作者写道，“我们看到的是帝国晚钟沉闷而凄厉的回响。”

Such language, once confined largely to nationalist corners of the Chinese internet, has increasingly entered mainstream political discourse.

这种语言曾经主要局限于中国互联网的民族主义角落，如今已越来越多地进入主流政治话语。

Evidence of this shift is measurable: The use of terms related to “American decline” in official Chinese sources nearly doubled in 2025, according to a study by two Brookings Institution researchers.

这一转变有可衡量的证据：根据布鲁金斯学会两位研究人员的报告，2025年中国官方来源中与“美国衰落”相关的表述使用频率几乎翻了一倍。

The narrative of American decline did not begin with Mr. Trump. For years, Chinese state media and nationalist pundits have highlighted mass shootings, homelessness, political polarization and economic inequality in the United States as evidence of the failures of Western democracy. More recently, official outlets embraced the viral phrase “kill line,” borrowed from video game culture, to describe what they portrayed as the irreversible downward spiral facing America’s working poor. It’s a familiar tactic of the Communist Party to distract the Chinese public from the country’s own issues.

美国衰落的叙事并非始于特朗普。多年来，中国官方媒体和民族主义评论人士一直突出美国的大规模枪击事件、无家可归、政治极化以及经济不平等，以此作为西方民主失败的证据。最近，官方媒体又采纳了从电子游戏文化中借来的流行词“斩杀线”，来描述他们所称的美国底层民众不可逆转的向下坠落。这是中共惯用的转移视线战术，旨在转移公众对中国自身问题的注意力。

But Mr. Trump’s return to office and his administration’s erratic decision-making in both domestic and foreign policy have supplied the propaganda machine with plentiful fresh material. Images of immigration raids, the Minneapolis shootings and bitter political infighting circulate widely on Chinese social media alongside triumphant commentary about American dysfunction. What once sounded to many educated Chinese like exaggerated propaganda increasingly feels, to some, observational.

但特朗普重返白宫及其政府在国内和外交政策上反复无常的决策为宣传机器提供了大量新鲜素材。移民突击搜查、明尼阿波利斯枪击事件以及激烈的政治内斗的画面在中国社交媒体上广泛传播，伴之以对美国机能失调兴高采烈的评论。对许多受过教育的中国人来说，曾经听起来像夸张宣传的内容，现在越来越像是观察到的现实。

A 31-year-old education consultant in northern China who advises families on overseas study told me that parents who had once aspired to Ivy League degrees for their children now saw America as “too chaotic.” A decade ago, more than 80 percent of his students considered the United States for study abroad, said the consultant, who asked me to use only his family name, Wang, for fear of government retribution. Now, he estimated, the figure has fallen to 45 percent.

中国北方一位31岁的教育咨询顾问（他为家庭提供留学建议）告诉我，那些曾经渴望孩子就读常春藤盟校的父母现在认为美国“太乱了”。由于担心遭到政府报复，这位顾问要求仅使用他的姓氏“王”。他说，十年前他的学生中超过80%考虑去美国留学，现在他估计这一比例已降至45%。

Mr. Wang described watching footage of the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol and finding himself thinking of the Red Guards that Mao Zedong dispatched to tear apart China’s institutions during the Cultural Revolution. That feeling returned more insistently with the immigration raids and the targeting of perceived enemies during Mr. Trump’s second term.

王先生说，在观看2021年1月6日美国国会大厦遇袭的画面时，他想到了“文革”期间毛泽东派去摧毁中国体制的红卫兵。这种感觉在特朗普第二任期的移民突击搜查和针对“敌人”的打击中变得愈发强烈。

“The America that represented wealth, freedom and institutional confidence feels like it belonged to a different era,” Mr. Wang said.

“那个代表着财富、自由和制度自信的美国似乎属于另一个时代，”王先生说。

北达科他州一农场正在装运大豆。上海外国语大学一位教授表示，随着中期选举临近，特朗普需要一个可见的胜利，比如中国采购美国大豆。

Among China’s foreign policy analysts, the conversation has turned to what Beijing can gain from the bilateral relationship, which has become more transactional under Mr. Trump than under President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

在中国的外交政策分析人士中，讨论的焦点已转向北京能从双边关系中获得什么。在特朗普治下，这种关系比在拜登总统时期更具交易性。

“Only China can save Trump,” said Huang Jing, a professor at Shanghai International Studies University, during a media event that was livestreamed in late 2025. With the U.S. midterm elections approaching, he argued, Mr. Trump needed visible wins such as Chinese purchases of American soybeans, corn and natural gas that could play well in swing states.

“只有中国才能救特朗普，”上海外国语大学教授黄靖在2025年末一场直播的媒体活动上说。他认为，随着美国中期选举临近，特朗普需要看得见的胜利，比如中国购买美国大豆、玉米和天然气，这些能在摇摆州产生良好效果。

“Since Trump,” Mr. Huang said at the event, “the United States has become increasingly prone to compromise.”

黄靖在活动中表示：“从特朗普开始，美国越来越易妥协，。”

Wu Xinbo, a leading American studies scholar at Fudan University, offered a similar assessment. If Republicans lose control of the House this fall, he said at the same event, Mr. Trump is likely to pivot toward his foreign policy legacy, creating space for a larger accommodation with Beijing.

复旦大学美国研究资深学者吴心伯也给出了类似评估。他说，如果共和党今年秋天失去众议院控制权，特朗普很可能转向打造自己的外交政策遗产，从而为与北京达成更大和解创造空间。

China, he said, “should make good use of this opportunity.”

他说，中国“应该好好利用这个机会”。

The war in Iran has reinforced the view that China has the upper hand with Mr. Trump. At a conference in late April, Mr. Wu argued that the war reduced Washington’s leverage against China while increasing Beijing’s by consuming American military and diplomatic attention in the Middle East.

伊朗战争进一步强化了中国在特朗普面前占据上风的观点。在4月底的一场会议上，吴心伯认为，这场战争消耗了美国在中东的军事和外交注意力，从而削弱了华盛顿对中国的杠杆，同时增加了北京的杠杆。

The logic helps explain why China’s official language regarding Mr. Trump has often been less hostile than it was regarding Mr. Biden. According to a project by the Tracking People’s Daily newsletter, which used artificial intelligence to analyze nearly 7,000 Chinese official statements since 2021, Mr. Biden was presented as a more systemic threat — so serious that Mr. Xi accused Washington of “encirclement and suppression,” unusually confrontational language for a Chinese leader.

这种逻辑有助于解释为什么中国官方对特朗普的措辞往往比对拜登温和。根据“Tracking People’s Daily”通讯项目使用人工智能对2021年以来近7000份中国官方声明的分析，拜登被呈现为更具系统性的威胁——严重到习近平指责华盛顿“遏制、围堵”，这是中国领导人极不寻常的对抗性语言。

By contrast, the study noted, “Trump’s transactionalism is something Beijing understands and can work with.”

相比之下，该研究指出，“特朗普的交易主义是北京能够理解并与之打交道的”。

Yet belief in U.S. decline has not translated into aggressive Chinese foreign policy, at least not the kind of overt geopolitical gamble that Russia made before invading Ukraine.

然而，对美国衰落的信念并未转化为激进的中国外交政策，至少不是俄罗斯入侵乌克兰前那种公开的地缘政治冒险。

China has become more assertive, pressuring U.S. allies, expanding military activity around Taiwan and restricting rare-earth exports in response to Mr. Trump’s tariffs. But even as Beijing advances the idea of the decline of American power, it appears wary of directly confronting what many Chinese analysts describe as a still dangerous superpower.

中国变得更加强势，对美国盟友施压、扩大在台湾周边的军事活动，并在回应特朗普关税时限制稀土出口。但即便北京推进美国实力衰落的叙事，它似乎仍谨慎避免直接对抗许多中国分析人士眼中仍然危险的超级大国。

Two factors play into this circumspection. First, many Chinese strategists believe Beijing can do better by sitting back while the Trump administration fumbles. Second, an unstable and distracted United States may also be a more unpredictable one.

有两个因素导致了这种谨慎。第一，许多中国战略家认为，让特朗普政府自己犯错，而北京坐收渔利，会更好。第二，一个不稳定且分心的美国，也可能是一个更难以预测的美国。

Beijing’s export-dependent economy needs a stable international order to function. An erratic United States threatens that stability in ways a confident, predictable America never did, Zongyuan Zoe Liu, an economist at the Council for Foreign Relations, told me.

外交关系委员会经济学家刘宗媛告诉我，北京以出口为主的经济需要一个稳定的国际秩序才能运转。一个反复无常的美国以一种自信、可预测的美国从未有过的方式威胁着这种稳定。

Mr. Xi “is getting the United States he always wanted,” she said, “and the America he most feared at the same time.”

习近平“正在得到他一直想要的美国”，她说，“同时也是他最害怕的那个美国。”

1万美元换情报：美国国会助理披露疑似中国间谍招募手法

Tue, 12 May 2026 06:06:03 +0000

DUSTIN VOLZ

2026年5月12日

When a man identifying himself as Chris Chen reached out this winter to an aide on a House committee focused on threats from China, he came armed with a lucrative offer.

去年冬天，一个自称克里斯·陈的男子联系上了一位供职于专门关注中国威胁的众议院委员会的助理，他带来了一个诱人的提议。

The staff member, Mr. Chen proposed, could earn $10,000 or more by barely lifting a finger. All he would need to do is agree to phone calls every other week to share information about the committee’s work and U.S. foreign policy about China.

克里斯·陈对这名工作人员提出，几乎不费吹灰之力就可以赚到1万美元甚至更多。他所需要做的只是每隔一周接听一次电话，分享该委员会的工作动态和美国对华外交政策的相关信息。

Insights into U.S. trade or national-security issues, including the Trump administration’s plans for Venezuela in the aftermath of the January military operation there, would be especially valuable, Mr. Chen said. To sweeten the pot, Mr. Chen repeatedly promised to send the aide $2,000 up front.

这位陈先生表示，涉及美国贸易或国家安全问题的内幕信息尤其有价值，包括1月份美国在委内瑞拉展开军事行动后特朗普政府对那里的计划。为了进一步提高吸引力，他一再承诺会先支付2000美元作为预付款。

The offer seemed too good to be true. Instead of quietly accepting the deal, the aide, whose identity The New York Times agreed to withhold because he works on sensitive policy issues related to China, reported it to his bosses on the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. The panel quickly concluded Mr. Chen was not the Singapore-based business consultant he claimed to be, but instead likely a Chinese intelligence officer or contractor seeking a new recruit.

这个提议好得令人难以置信。这名助理没有悄悄接受这笔交易，而是向他在众议院中国问题特设委员会的上司报告了此事。（由于工作涉及涉华敏感政策，《纽约时报》应其要求隐去其身份）该委员会很快断定，克里斯·陈并不是他自称的新加坡商业顾问，而很可能是一名正在寻找新线人的中国情报官员或线人承包商。

An offer of $10,000 for information

以1万美元换取情报

By framing the initial offer as a “trial period,” Mr. Chen dangled the expectation of a longer relationship with more payments to come, a common recruitment hook for spies.

克里斯·陈将最初的提议包装成“试用期”，以此暗示双方将建立更长期的合作关系、未来还有更多报酬，这是间谍招募中惯用的诱饵手法。

“I would like to propose … three-month trial period lasting until the end of March. … And I will provide a total compensation of $10,000 for the three-month trial period.”

“我想提议……为期三个月的试用期，持续到3月底……在三个月的试用期内，我将提供总计1万美元的报酬。”

Rather than cut off contact, the committee’s Republican majority staff agreed to keep talking to Mr. Chen. They recorded a series of calls this winter to learn more about Mr. Chen’s tactics and interests.

该委员会的多数党共和党工作人员没有切断联系，而是同意继续与陈先生联络。他们在去年冬天录下了一系列通话，以深入了解他的手段和意图。

Transcripts of those calls, which the committee shared with The Times alongside some of the recorded audio, depict a determined, at times impatient, individual eager to earn the trust of his mark and get down to business. Mr. Chen mixes holiday greetings with elaborate questions about manufacturing in Vietnam and Mexico and the future of Venezuela’s oil industry.

该委员会与《纽约时报》分享了这些通话的文字记录以及部分录音。记录显示，克里斯·陈是个意志坚定、有时会不耐烦的人，急于赢得目标对象的信任并尽快进入实质合作。他在节日问候的寒暄之间，夹杂着对越南、墨西哥制造业现状以及委内瑞拉石油工业前景的详细询问。

特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平之间的关系日趋紧张。图为两人去年秋天会晤时的场景。

Beijing and Washington have been aggressively spying on one another for decades, an inevitable byproduct of the world’s two largest economies competing across the globe. But by their nature, those shadow games rarely surface such a detailed look at how either side plies its trade.

多年来，北京与华盛顿一直在相互进行激烈的间谍活动，这是世界两大经济体在全球竞争所不可避免的副产品。但由于其隐秘性质，这类影子游戏很少会让其中一方的手法暴露得如此详细。

The outreach by Mr. Chen to an aide on the very committee responsible for investigating Chinese national-security threats appears to provide an unusually vivid portrait of how Beijing’s spy services seek to gain access to sensitive information from within the corridors of power in Washington.

克里斯·陈主动接触专门负责调查中国国家安全威胁的委员会的助理，此举似乎异常生动地展示了北京的情报机构是如何试图渗透华盛顿的权力走廊、获取敏感信息的。

By some measures, the spying on both sides has intensified in recent months, as the bilateral relationship — which will be tested next week during a summit in Beijing between President Trump and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping — has grown more strained.

按照某些衡量标准，美中双方近来的间谍活动都有所升级，因为两国关系已愈发紧张，而本周特朗普总统与中国领导人习近平在北京举行的峰会将是对这一关系的重大考验。

Chinese hackers are believed by U.S. investigators to have at least twice compromised internal networks at the F.B.I. related to its sensitive surveillance activities. The C.I.A. has published videos on social media in Mandarin openly seeking to recruit spies from China’s military that have led to new assets being developed in the country, according to U.S. intelligence officials.

美国调查人员认为，中国黑客至少两次侵入了联邦调查局内部与其敏感监视活动相关的网络。中央情报局在社交媒体上发布普通话视频，公开招募来自中国军方的情报人员，据美国情报官员透露，美方已借此在中国境内发展出新的情报来源。

After about two months of conversations with Mr. Chen, the House committee referred the matter to the F.B.I., which declined to comment when asked if it had opened an investigation, but it has been tracking increasingly brazen intelligence-gathering operations by China. It said only that “China and other foreign governments are using professional networking social media sites to target people with U.S. government security clearances.”

在与克里斯·陈保持联络约两个月后，该众议院委员会将此事移交给了联邦调查局。联邦调查局拒绝就是否已立案展开调查置评，但该局一直在追踪中国日益猖獗的情报收集行动。它仅表示，“中国及其他外国政府正在利用专业社交网络平台，对持有美国政府安全许可的人员实施定向渗透。”

Seeking to cultivate a source in the heart of a congressional committee dedicated to addressing the threat from China would be an especially audacious move.

试图在一个专门应对中国威胁的国会委员会内部培植线人无疑是极为大胆的举动。

Mr. Chen first contacted the staff member in December from a Gmail account with a display name of Kris Chen, though he signed his emails with the spelling Chris. He described himself as an employee of NimbusHub Strategic Consulting, a Hong Kong-based firm with a spartan website that promises “to provide clients with the tools and knowledge necessary to navigate an increasingly complex global landscape.” The website contains filler text in Latin, which often auto-populates within unfinished sections of websites.

陈先生首次联系该工作人员是在去年12月，使用的是Gmail账户，邮件账户显示他的姓名为“Kris Chen”，但他在邮件中的署名拼写为“Chris”。他自称供职于香港一家名为NimbusHub Strategic Consulting的咨询公司，该公司官网十分简陋，声称“为客户提供应对日益复杂的全球环境所需的工具和知识”。网站还出现了作为占位符的拉丁文，它们通常自动出现在网站未完成的部分。

Other clues point to NimbusHub as a front for China’s spy services. In a February report on malicious uses of its artificial-intelligence tools, OpenAI identified ChatGPT users who had used the model to generate email drafts purporting to be from employees of NimbusHub. The emails addressed to state officials in the United States and policy analysts working in business and finance came from personas who, like Mr. Chen, sought to offer paid consulting gigs for information.

还有一些线索表明，NimbusHub可能是中国情报部门的幌子。OpenAI在今年2月的一份关于其人工智能工具遭滥用的报告中指出，有ChatGPT用户曾借助该模型起草电子邮件，发件人自称是NimbusHub的员工。这些邮件被发送给美国各州官员及商界、金融领域的政策分析人士，发件人以虚拟身份试图以“付费咨询工作”为名换取信息，其手法与克里斯·陈如出一辙。

NimbusHub did not respond to emailed requests for comment, nor did Mr. Chen on the Gmail account or phone number he used to contact the congressional aide. The profile picture for Mr. Chen’s WhatsApp number depicts a Winnie-the-Pooh doll wearing large headphones, an apparent mocking reference to Mr. Xi. Winnie-the-Pooh imagery has for years been a target of censorship in China and a symbol of resistance, which would fit with a persona of a Hong Kong businessman at a remove from mainland China.

NimbusHub没有回复通过电子邮件提出的置评请求，陈先生用来联系国会助理的Gmail邮箱和电话号码也没有回应。他的WhatsApp头像是一只戴着大耳机的小熊维尼玩偶——这显然是在讽刺习近平。多年来，小熊维尼的形象在中国一直是审查的对象，也是抵抗的象征，这与克里斯·陈“远离中国大陆的香港商人”人设相吻合。

香港大有大厦。

There was no sign of NimbusHub at the Hong Kong address listed on the firm’s website when a Times reporter visited Tuesday. An office directory displayed near the elevator banks of the 24-story tower, Tai Yau Building, in the heart of the city’s crowded Wan Chai district, listed 94 other tenants. Two women stationed at a concierge booth in the beige-tiled lobby said they had never heard of NimbusHub.

《纽约时报》记者于周二前往该公司网站所列的香港地址时，并未发现NimbusHub的任何踪迹。这栋24层高的大厦位于湾仔繁华地段，名为大有大厦，电梯厅的租户目录列有94家公司的名称，没有NimbusHub。在米色瓷砖铺就的大堂服务台，两名女接待员表示，她们从未听说过NimbusHub这家公司。

Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said in a statement that “the so-called false narrative regarding China engaging in espionage activities is entirely devoid of factual basis or evidence.”

中国驻华盛顿大使馆发言人刘鹏宇在声明中表示，“所谓中国从事间谍活动的虚假叙事完全缺乏事实依据或证据支持”。

Interest in U.S. plans for Venezuela

对美国在委内瑞拉的计划感兴趣

Days after the U.S. military in January captured the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, in a nighttime raid in Caracas, Mr. Chen asked for insights into U.S. plans for Venezuela.

今年1月，美国军方在加拉加斯发动夜间突袭，逮捕了委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗。数日后，克里斯·陈便询问美国对委内瑞拉的下一步计划。

”Maybe next time we can discuss Venezuela, like how it ties into the U.S. reshaping supply chains, such as the oil supply chain, and the key minerals and the manufacturing supply chain.”

“也许下次我们可以聊聊委内瑞拉，比如它如何与美国重塑供应链联系在一起，例如石油供应链、关键矿产以及制造业供应链。”

The introductory email from Mr. Chen on Dec. 17 was full of business jargon, and presented the chance to share information as a way to offer “expert consultation and viewpoint exchange, including real-time policy and news interpretation and forward-looking strategic insights.”

克里斯·陈在12月17日发出的第一封邮件里充斥着商业术语，并将情报的分享描述为一种“提供专家咨询和观点交流的机会，包括实时政策与新闻解读，以及前瞻性战略洞察”。

After notifying his colleagues on the committee, the congressional aide responded and conveyed an interest in expanding his “advisory work outside my primary duties.” From then on, Mr. Chen appeared hooked. In follow-up emails and on phone calls, he expressed a willingness to be flexible with the work arrangement while making clear he was eager to start paying.

在向委员会同事报告此事后，这名国会助理回复了邮件，表示有兴趣“在主要职责之外拓展咨询业务”。在那以后，克里斯·陈似乎上钩了。在后续邮件和电话中，他一再表示愿意在合作安排上保持灵活，但明确表示希望尽快开始支付酬劳。

该委员会的共和党主席、众议员约翰·穆伦纳尔去年曾成为一起疑似中国情报行动的目标。

“I can pay you $2,000 — $2,000 advance payment,” Mr. Chen said during a call in January. “As soon as possible in the next few days, just to make sure our operation is getting started.”

“我可以付你2000美元——2000美元预付款，”他在1月的一次通话中说，“在接下来的几天内尽快，就为了确保我们的合作能够启动。”

Mr. Chen at times seemed most curious to learn what those close to power in the United States thought about China’s stated intentions, such as a commitment to purchase U.S. soybeans or whether China would relax control over rare-earth minerals. “So if China turns the controls back next year, do you guys have a plan B?” he asked.

陈先生有时似乎最想了解那些接近美国权力核心的人如何看待中国公开表明的意图，例如中国购买美国大豆的承诺，或者中国是否会放松对稀土矿产的管控。“那么，如果中国明年重新实施管制，你们有备用方案吗？”他问道。

The committee has been targeted by Chinese intelligence operations before. Last year, the panel disclosed that an apparent impostor was posing as its Republican chairman, Representative John Moolenaar of Michigan, and sending emails to government agencies and other institutions seeking information about potential sanctions against Beijing. Cybersecurity investigators linked the emails to a hacking group with ties to the Ministry of State Security, a central spy agency for China.

这并非该委员会第一次成为中国情报行动的目标。去年，该委员会披露，一名冒充者假借委员会共和党主席、密歇根州众议员约翰·穆勒纳尔的名义，向政府机构和其他单位发送邮件，索取有关对华潜在制裁的信息。网络安全调查人员将这些邮件追踪至一个与中国国家安全部有关联的黑客组织。

“The Chinese government actively targets Congress and congressional staff as part of a broader influence and intelligence collection effort, frequently using benign-appearing inquiries to get sensitive information,” Mr. Moolenaar said in a statement.

穆伦纳尔在声明中表示：“中国政府将国会和国会工作人员列为目标，这是其更广泛的影响力渗透和情报收集行动的组成部分，经常利用看似无害的询问获取敏感信息。”

Access to the boss

接触老板的机会

Mr. Chen does little to hide his interest in mapping the House aide’s proximity to powerful figures in Washington.

克里斯·陈几乎毫不掩饰自己想弄清这名众议院助手与华盛顿权势人物之间距离有多近。

Mr. Chen: So the congressman is the person in the committee, right?

陈：那么这位议员就是委员会里的人，对吧？

Aide: Yes, he’s the boss. He’s the top boss.

助手：是的，他是老板，是最大的老板。

Mr. Chen: If he’s the boss, you work for the chairman, right?

陈：如果他是老板，那你就是为委员会主席工作，对吧？

Aide: Correct.

助手：对的。

Mr. Chen: Wow. Wow.

陈：哇！哇！

China has a long record of targeting U.S. politicians and federal workers for espionage, including the theft of government personnel files on more than 20 million people a decade ago. Last year, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based think tank, and Reuters found evidence that a network of fake consulting firms controlled by a Chinese technology firm was targeting former government employees who had lost their jobs at the start of the second Trump administration.

中国长期以来一直针对美国政治人物和联邦工作人员进行间谍活动，包括10年前曾窃取超过2000万人的政府人事档案。去年，总部位于华盛顿的智库“保卫民主基金会”和路透社发现证据表明，一家中国科技公司控制着一个由虚假咨询公司组成的网络，正在对特朗普第二个任期上台之初遭裁员的前政府雇员实施定向渗透。

Recruiting an aide on the House China Committee is not likely to be as valuable as turning an intelligence official with access to classified material about U.S. nuclear weapons programs, bespoke hacking tools or espionage assets in China, experts said. But the panel is still a high-value target. The congressional aide cut off contact with Mr. Chen in late February before being paid, citing an internal ethics determination. Mr. Chen lamented the development, but emailed again days later to say he believed they could get around the conflict.

专家表示，策反众议院中国委员会的一名助理，其情报价值或许不及收买一名能接触美国核武器计划、定制黑客工具或在华情报资产等涉密材料的情报官员。但该委员会仍是一个极具价值的目标。这名国会助理以内部道德审查为由，于2月下旬中断了与克里斯·陈的联系，此时他尚未收到任何付款。克里斯·陈对此深表遗憾，但数日后再度发来邮件，称相信双方可以绕过这一障碍。

“If you are still interested in exploring a collaboration, I would welcome the chance to walk you through this alternative path during a brief call,” Mr. Chen said. “Please let me know if this is of interest to you.”

“如果您仍有意探讨合作可能，我希望能有机会在简短的通话中，向您介绍这一替代路径，”他写道。“请告知您是否有兴趣。”

The aide never responded.

该工作人员此后再未回复。

习近平或就对台军售问题向特朗普施压

Tue, 12 May 2026 05:06:02 +0000

储百亮

2026年5月12日

The United States’ stance on Taiwan has rested for decades on a complex latticework of policies designed to support the island democracy while avoiding treating it officially as an independent country, a step that would enrage Beijing.

几十年来，美国的对台政策一直建立在一个复杂的政策网络之上，其目的是支持这个岛屿民主政体，同时避免正式将其视为一个独立国家——这一步将激怒北京。

Many in Taiwan are holding their breath for what may happen to that delicate structure when President Trump, with his off-the-cuff, transactional ways, meets China’s leader, Xi Jinping, in Beijing for a two-day summit starting Thursday. Mr. Xi appears poised to lecture Mr. Trump on U.S. support for Taiwan, especially weapons sales.

许多台湾人正屏息以待，当特朗普总统以其即兴、交易式的作风于周四开始在北京与中国领导人习近平举行为期两天的峰会时，这个微妙的结构将会发生什么。习近平似乎已准备好就美国对台湾的支持——尤其是武器销售——向特朗普发出告诫。

Mr. Trump and his officials have said that his trip to Beijing will be focused on trade and investment. But China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, and other officials have indicated that they also expect the two presidents to discuss Taiwan, the issue that could most likely ignite a war between their countries. China claims Taiwan is its territory, and could use armed force to take it, while the United States says it could intervene to defend Taiwan, a longtime partner.

特朗普及其官员表示，他此次北京之行将重点关注贸易和投资。但中国外交部长王毅和其他官员已表示，他们也期待两位总统讨论台湾问题——这是最有可能引发两国之间战争的议题。中国声称台湾是其领土，并可能动用武力夺取它；而美国则表示，可能介入以保卫台湾这个长期伙伴。

Beijing’s Expectations

北京的期待

“The Taiwan question is at the very core of China’s core interests,” Lin Jian, a spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry said last week when asked if the issue would be a priority for Mr. Xi at the summit.

中国外交部发言人林剑上周在被问及台湾问题是否会成为习近平在峰会的优先事项时表示：“台湾问题是中国核心利益中的核心。”

Taiwan often comes up in talks between Chinese and U.S. leaders. But the summit’s setting in Beijing will give Mr. Xi more opportunity and time to make his case, said Ryan Hass, a former director for China at the National Security Council.

台湾问题经常出现在中美领导人会谈中。但曾任美国国家安全委员会中国事务主任的何瑞恩(Ryan Hass)指出，在北京举行的这次峰会将给习近平更多机会和时间来阐述中方立场。

Mr. Xi may try to persuade Mr. Trump to say that he opposes Taiwanese independence. That could be a setback for Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, though he has said he has no plans to declare independence. Successive U.S. presidents have said they “do not support” independence for Taiwan. Declaring “opposition” may suggest greater sympathy with Beijing’s view that Mr. Lai’s government is the side stirring up trouble, experts said.

习近平可能会试图说服特朗普公开表示反对台湾独立。这可能对台湾总统赖清德构成打击，尽管他已表示没有计划宣布独立。历届美国总统都表示“不支持”台湾独立。而专家们说，明确表示“反对”可能会显得更倾向于北京的观点，即赖清德的政府是挑起事端的一方。

“It could be easily used by China to claim that the U.S. is taking Beijing’s side, and even create new diplomatic pressure on Taiwan,” said Chen Kuan-ting, a lawmaker from Mr. Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party.

赖清德所在的民进党立法委员陈冠廷表示：“这容易被中国拿来宣传成美方站到北京立场，甚至对台湾形成新的外交压力。”

Large U.S. Arms Purchases at Stake

巨额美国军售面临风险

Mr. Xi’s main focus in raising Taiwan will probably be to persuade Mr. Trump to slow, or ultimately reduce, U.S. arms sales to the island, experts from China and Washington have said. In a phone call in February, Mr. Xi urged Mr. Trump to handle the issue of arms sales with “extreme caution.”

来自中国和华盛顿的专家表示，习近平提出台湾问题的主要重点，可能是说服特朗普放缓、甚至最终减少美国对台湾的武器销售。今年2月的一次通话中，习近平敦促特朗普“慎重”处理武器销售问题。

The Trump administration approved $11 billion in arms sales to Taiwan late last year, drawing condemnation from Beijing, which quickly held a two-day military exercise near Taiwan. Another arms sale package worth around $14 billion is awaiting final approval from Mr. Trump, who has held off making a decision for months already.

特朗普政府去年底批准了对台价值110亿美元的武器销售，引发北京强烈谴责，并迅速在台湾附近举行了两天的军事演习。另一批价值约140亿美元的武器销售方案正等待特朗普最终批准，他已经拖延数月，尚未作出决定。

China wants Mr. Trump to delay approval, and ultimately to persuade him and his successors to roll back broader military support to Taiwan, said Xin Qiang, the director of the Center for Taiwan Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.

上海复旦大学台湾研究中心主任信强表示，中国希望特朗普推迟批准，并最终说服他及其继任者缩减对台湾的更广泛军事支持。

“But China also knows that’s difficult right now,” he said, “so they hope at least for delays and then a reduction — a reduction in the monetary value of the arms, in the scale, in the quality of the weapons sold.”

“但中国也知道目前这很困难，”他说，“所以他们至少希望能拖延，然后逐步减少——减少武器销售的金额、规模和武器质量。”

China’s Economic Levers

中国的经济杠杆

Professor Xin acknowledged that coaxing Mr. Trump to significantly curtail U.S. arms sales would be a long shot. But if the U.S. sells more weapons to Taiwan, he added, “China certainly won’t be as enthusiastic about purchasing goods from the United States like agricultural products or Boeing aircraft.”

信强承认，要说服特朗普大幅削减对台军售是一项长期而艰难的任务。但他补充说，如果美国继续向台湾出售更多武器，“从美国采购农产品啊，购买波音飞机啊，那肯定也不会那么积极。”

Many in Washington, including from both parties in Congress, support weapons sales to Taiwan. Taiwanese lawmakers last week approved a $25 billion special budget to cover the two big weapons packages, including the one waiting in the wings, adding to pressure on Mr. Trump. In a letter sent on Friday, a bipartisan group of eight U.S. senators urged Mr. Trump to move ahead on it.

华盛顿的许多人士，包括国会两党议员，都支持对台武器销售。台湾立法委员上周批准了一项250亿美元的特别预算，用于支付这两笔大型武器采购方案（包括正在等待批准的那一笔），这给特朗普增加了压力。上周五，由八名两党参议员组成的小组致信特朗普，敦促他推进这笔140亿美元的武器销售案。

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who will accompany Mr. Trump to Beijing, last week brushed off speculation that the summit could produce a shift in U.S. policy toward Taiwan. “The Chinese understand our position on that topic. We understand theirs,” Mr. Rubio told a news conference at the White House.

将陪同特朗普前往北京的国务卿马可·鲁比奥上周在白宫记者会上淡化了峰会可能改变美国对台政策的猜测。“中国人理解我们在这个议题上的立场。我们也理解他们的立场，”鲁比奥说。

Taiwanese officials have taken reassurance from such comments.

台湾官员从这些表态中获得了一定安心。

“The U.S. continues to reiterate in both public and private settings that its policy toward Taiwan has not changed,” Tsai Ming-yen, the director-general of Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, told lawmakers in Taipei last week.

台湾国家安全局局长蔡明彦上周在台北告诉立法委员：“美方在这种公开或私下的场合也不断重申对于台湾的政策并没有改变。”

Still, Mr. Xi could hold out the lure of economic deals and more summits later this year, including in Washington, to try to get Mr. Trump to hold back on the latest proposed arms package, said Mr. Hass, the former National Security Council official, now a China expert at the Brookings Institution.

尽管如此，前国家安全委员会官员、现布鲁金斯学会中国专家何瑞恩表示，习近平仍可能以今年晚些时候更多经济协议和在华盛顿举行更多峰会的诱惑，来试图让特朗普暂缓最新提出的武器销售案。

“As a result, I have low expectations that Trump will approve another tranche of arms sales to Taiwan between now and this fall,” he said.

“因此，我认为从现在开始到今年秋季这段时间，特朗普不太会批准另一批对台军售，”他说。

中阿射电望远镜项目搁浅背后：当中美之争殃及南美星空

Tue, 12 May 2026 04:06:02 +0000

EMMA BUBOLA, 黄安伟

2026年5月12日

In the foothills of the Argentine Andes, the enormous Chinese radio telescope sits in one of the world’s premier stargazing locations, surrounded by vast, undulating mountain ranges and beneath skies untouched by light pollution. It is also on the opposite side of the planet from Beijing, offering China a window on the half of the heavens it would not otherwise see.

在阿根廷安第斯山脉的山麓地带，这座巨大的中国射电望远镜坐落于世界顶级观星地之一，四周环绕着辽阔起伏的山脉，头顶是未受光污染影响的纯净夜空。该望远镜也位于北京在地球对侧的位置，为中国开启了一扇窗口，得以观测另一半它原本无法观测的天空。

But the Chinese telescope at the site, the Cesco observatory in San Juan Province, picks up no signals. After the U.S. government repeatedly pressed them on the issue, the Argentine authorities stopped the project’s completion. Lacking key parts, the telescope now sits dismembered, its gigantic antenna pointing blindly at the sky.

然而，这座位于圣胡安省塞斯科天文台的中国望远镜，如今无法接收任何信号。在美国政府就此事反复施压后，阿根廷当局叫停了该项目建设。由于关键部件缺失，望远镜如今处于解体状态，巨大的天线茫然地指向天空。

As the United States increasingly views Beijing as a rival in space, the stars above South America have become flash points in a geopolitical struggle, with top American officials trying to halt astronomy projects in the Andean deserts out of fear China could use them for military purposes.

随着美国日益将中国视为太空领域的竞争对手，南美洲上空的星空已成为地缘政治博弈的焦点。美国高层官员试图阻止安第斯沙漠中的天文项目，担心中国可能将其用于军事目的。

The Trump administration says it is enforcing an updated Monroe Doctrine, in part to counter China’s growing footprint in the Western Hemisphere. China is a key trading partner for many countries in Latin America, and it is trying to build scientific and security ties. Its relations in the region could come up in official talks this week in Beijing between President Trump and Xi Jinping, China’s leader.

特朗普政府表示，正在推行更新版的门罗主义，部分目的是遏制中国在西半球日益增长的影响力。中国是拉美多国的重要贸易伙伴，并致力于构建科技与安全合作关系。本周，特朗普总统将与中国国家主席习近平在北京举行正式会谈，双方或提及中国在该地区的关系问题。

Last year, Argentina’s neighbor Chile stopped a Chinese astronomical observatory project in the Atacama Desert after strong urging from a U.S. ambassador. And in the case of the Cesco observatory’s Chinese radio telescope project — which would be the largest of its kind in South America — authorities have held some key, final parts for it at customs for about nine months.

去年，在美方大使的强烈敦促下，阿根廷的邻国智利叫停了中国在阿塔卡马沙漠建设天文观测站的项目。塞斯科天文台的中国射电望远镜项目建成后将成为南美同类设施中规模最大的，其部分关键收尾部件已被阿根廷海关扣留约九个月。

According to a document from the Argentine government’s cabinet chief, procedural violations in renewing the deal with China prevented the project from going forward. The government declined to comment on whether the U.S. diplomacy played a role in the decision.

阿根廷政府内阁首席部长的一份文件显示，与中国续签协议过程中存在程序违规，导致项目无法推进。对于美国外交施压是否影响了该决定，阿根廷政府拒绝置评。

几位天文学家正在一架位于中国未完工射电望远镜附近的望远镜旁工作。

But current and former American officials, some of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomacy, said the U.S. government had repeatedly expressed concerns with the Argentine authorities about the Chinese telescope, worried it could be used to track U.S. satellites and communicate with Chinese ones.

但多位现任及前任美国官员（因涉及敏感外交事务，部分人要求匿名）表示，美国政府已就中国射电望远镜项目多次向阿根廷当局表达关切，担心其可用于追踪美国卫星并与中国卫星通信。

The campaign began during the Biden administration and continued under President Trump.

这一施压行动始于拜登政府时期，并在特朗普总统任期内持续进行。

Argentine astronomers, who have spent most of their lives observing stars light years away, have received a crash course in earthly politics.

阿根廷的天文学家们毕生都在观测数光年外的恒星，如今却不得不仓促学习现实政治。

Scientists had looked forward to sharing the telescope with China and other nations. Then they learned that the U.S. effort to check China had reached the deserts of South America, threatening their search into the vastness of space.

科学家们曾期待与中国及其他国家共享这座望远镜，如今却发现，美国遏制中国的举措已延伸至南美沙漠，威胁着他们探索浩瀚宇宙的计划。

“We are stuck in a political black hole,” said Ana Maria Pacheco, 61, an astronomer.

61岁的天文学家安娜·玛丽亚·帕切科说：“我们陷进了一个政治黑洞里。”

The State Department did not reply to requests for comment.

美国国务院未回应置评请求。

In 2015, as China was expanding its presence across South America, the Chinese military built another facility, a $50 million satellite and space mission control station in Neuquén Province, in Argentina’s Patagonian desert. Argentina gave China the use of the land where the station was built, rent free, for 50 years.

2015年，中国在南美影响力持续扩大之际，中国军方在阿根廷巴塔哥尼亚沙漠的内乌肯省建造了另一处设施——一座耗资5000万美元的卫星及航天任务控制站。阿根廷将该中心所在地块无偿租借给中国，租期50年。

For China hawks in Washington, that Patagonian base became a symbol of how Argentina was being pulled into China’s orbit, and the site’s antenna there stands as a 450-ton cautionary tale.

对于华盛顿的对华鹰派而言，这座巴塔哥尼亚基地成为阿根廷被拉入中国势力范围的象征，基地内450吨重的天线俨然是一则警示寓言。

The Trump administration has forged a tight bond with Javier Milei, Argentina’s right-wing president, and aided him with a $20 billion lifeline ahead of key midterm elections last year.

特朗普政府与阿根廷右翼总统哈维尔·米莱建立了紧密关系，并在去年关键中期选举前向其提供200亿美元的救命钱。

位于埃尔莱翁西托的塞斯科天文台的一台望远镜。

中国望远镜地下室内的物品。

While running for president, Mr. Milei expressed hostility toward China. But after being elected in 2023, he softened his tone, perhaps facing the reality that China’s economy is entwined with that of Argentina through trade, infrastructure, mining projects and financial assistance, just as it is in other Latin American countries.

米莱竞选总统期间曾对中国持敌对态度，但2023年当选后态度软化。这或许是因为他意识到，阿根廷的经济已通过贸易、基建、矿业项目及金融援助与中国深度绑定，拉美多国亦是如此。

U.S. officials say they are aware that dislodging China from Latin America will be hard. Still, they see the frozen gears of the San Juan radio telescope — which was built in partnership between the National University of San Juan and the National Astronomical Observatory of China — as a sign that U.S. diplomacy can help thwart aspects of China’s space ambitions, and perhaps its military ones too.

美国官员表示，将中国逐出拉美并非易事。尽管如此，他们仍将圣胡安射电望远镜的停滞——该项目由圣胡安国立大学与中国国家天文台合作建设——视为美国外交能够牵制中国的太空野心、或许也包括军事野心的例证。

The Chinese Embassy in Buenos Aires said in a statement that the U.S. was “looking for an excuse to contain and suppress China.” They said the project was aimed at promoting scientific progress in both Argentina and China, with benefits for all of humanity. They called the American position “ridiculous and regrettable.”

中国驻布宜诺斯艾利斯大使馆发表声明称，美方是在“找借口遏制打压中国”，强调该项目旨在推动阿中两国科技进步，造福全人类，指责美方立场“荒谬且令人遗憾”。

When the Chilean observatory project was halted last year, the Chinese Embassy in Santiago said in a statement that the United States also uses telescopes in Chile and accused it of a “pure and simple manifestation of hegemonism.”

去年智利天文台项目被叫停时，中国驻圣地亚哥大使馆发表声明，指出美国也在智利使用射电望远镜，指责其行径是“赤裸裸的霸权主义”。

The United States does have a significant astronomical presence in South America, with NASA using several space stations to track satellites.

美国在南美确实拥有相当规模的天文设施，NASA使用多个空间站开展卫星追踪工作。

Stargazing With China

与中国共探星空

圣胡安国立大学天文学家埃里克·冈萨雷斯（左），他站在这座尚未完工的中国望远镜的地下室里。埃尔莱翁西托的塞斯科天文台内，几位天文学家站在一座射电台旁。这里的天空被认为是世界上最适合研究太空的地方之一。

The Argentine observatory in San Juan where the disputed Chinese telescope stands was inaugurated in the 1960s in partnership with Yale and Columbia University. Argentina has some of the world’s clearest, cloudless skies, and German, Russian and Brazilian institutions built telescopes that now dot the observatory’s grounds. Construction has started on a new telescope in collaboration with the University of Texas.

圣胡安省这座存有争议的中国望远镜所在的阿根廷天文台是在20世纪60年代与耶鲁大学、哥伦比亚大学合作建成的。阿根廷拥有全球最澄澈的少云天空，德国、俄罗斯、巴西等国机构在此建设的望远镜如今点缀在这座天文台的场地中。目前，与得克萨斯大学合作的新望远镜已开始建设。

But the venture with China tested the limits of this astronomical cosmopolitanism.

但与中国的合作项目却考验着这种天文国际主义的极限。

The China Argentina Radio Telescope was a $32 million investment that started about 15 years ago. It has a 130-foot-wide antenna: a gigantic satellite dish that allows scientists to capture invisible radio waves from space to map the birth of stars and distant galaxies. It is thanks to these types of telescopes that astronomers captured the first-ever image of a black hole in 2019.

中阿射电望远镜项目总投资3200万美元，约15年前启动。望远镜配备了直径约40米的巨大卫星碟形天线，可捕捉宇宙中的不可见射电波，助力科学家绘制恒星与遥远星系的诞生图景。正是借助这类望远镜，天文学家于2019年首次拍到黑洞照片。

In 2023, 100 trucks carrying the telescope’s enormous iron components wound their way up narrow mountain roads to the observatory. Along with the machinery came a team of Chinese technicians who took up residence in Barreal, the nearest town, where horses and cows wander past low-slung houses.

2023年，100辆卡车装载着望远镜的巨型铁制构件，沿着狭窄山路蜿蜒而上运抵天文台。随行的还有中国技术团队，他们驻扎在附近的巴雷亚尔小镇，在那里低矮的房屋旁边，牛马悠闲地漫步。

From early in the Biden administration, top White House national security officials and State Department diplomats were aware of the project. In August 2021, Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, and Juan Gonzalez, the top White House adviser on Latin America, raised the issue during a visit to Buenos Aires, Mr. Gonzalez said.

拜登政府上任初期，白宫国家安全官员与国务院外交官便已知晓该项目。白宫拉丁美洲事务高级顾问胡安·冈萨雷斯称，2021年8月，国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文与他本人在访问布宜诺斯艾利斯期间，就曾提出该问题。

The American officials told Alberto Fernández, then the president of Argentina, that they were concerned about several Chinese projects, including the radio telescope, a port in Ushuaia in the far south, and the base in Neuquén, he said.

冈萨雷斯表示，美方官员向时任阿根廷总统阿尔韦托·费尔南德斯表达了对阿根廷多个中国项目的担忧，包括这座射电望远镜、阿根廷最南端乌斯怀亚的港口，以及位于内乌肯省的那座基地。

The Argentine president said he would ensure the projects were not used for military purposes, Mr. Gonzalez said, but a 50-year lease on the land in Neuquén meant China had a strong legal case to continue using that site.

冈萨雷斯说，阿根廷总统承诺确保这些项目不用于军事目的，但内乌肯土地50年的租约，意味着中国拥有继续使用该设施的坚实法律依据。

American officials, in diplomatic conversations, pushed harder on the radio telescope project in San Juan.

在外交磋商中，美国官员对圣胡安射电望远镜项目的态度更加强硬。

The Trump administration kept up the pressure. In February 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed “space collaboration” with Gerardo Werthein, Argentina’s foreign minister at the time, according to a State Department summary of the call.

特朗普政府延续了施压态势。国务院通话纪要显示，2025年2月，国务卿鲁比奥与时任阿根廷外长赫拉多·韦尔海恩就“太空合作”问题进行了讨论。

That spring, experts from the Sandia lab in Albuquerque, run by the Department of Energy, traveled to Buenos Aires to brief Argentine officials about the possible risks posed by the Chinese telescope, American officials said.

美国官员称，同年春季，美国能源部管理下的阿尔伯克基桑迪亚国家实验室的专家前往布宜诺斯艾利斯，向阿根廷官员说明该中国望远镜可能带来的风险。

At the State Department’s urging, the office of the U.S. trade representative included language in a new bilateral trade agreement that tried to limit Argentina’s ability to work with China on space projects.

在国务院敦促下，美国贸易代表办公室在新的双边贸易协定中加入相关条款，试图限制阿根廷与中国在航天项目上的合作。

The document says Argentina must cooperate with “U.S. government technical experts to implement sufficient control measures at space installations operated by other countries to ensure their exclusively civilian use.”

该文件规定，阿根廷须与“美国政府技术专家合作，在他国运营的太空设施中实施充分管控措施，确保其仅用于民用目的”。

Argentina’s agreement with China to build the telescope expired last summer. Shortly after, customs authorities froze some key parts of the antenna in the port of Buenos Aires.

阿中望远镜合作协议于去年夏天到期。此后不久，阿根廷海关在布宜诺斯艾利斯港扣留了其天线的部分关键部件。

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