CGTN - Opinions

Auckland Mayor Wayne Brown: Why cities need openness and connectivity

CGTN — Thu, 05 Nov 2026 08:19:14 GMT

24:33

Editor's Note: How can openness and connectivity drive shared growth? What can cities learn from each other? In this exclusive interview on The Hub, Wang Guan speaks with Wayne Brown, mayor of Auckland, New Zealand, on the sidelines of the 2026 Global Mayors Dialogue in Ningbo, a port city in east China's Zhejiang Province. Brown explores New Zealand-China cooperation, from Auckland learning from Ningbo's port efficiency to city-to-city exchanges, tech innovation and cross-sector collaboration. He also champions open trade over protectionism, and how connectivity improves urban life.

China's high-quality development: A Merck China perspective

CGTN — Wed, 04 Nov 2026 03:25:36 GMT

27:23

Editor's Note: As Shanghai hosts the 9th China International Import Expo (CIIE) from November 5 to 10, what opportunities will China's evolving market offer to multinational companies? As China enters a new phase of high-quality development, how are global companies positioning themselves for the opportunities ahead? On The Hub, Wang Guan speaks with Rogier Janssens, president of Merck China and managing director of Merck Life Science China. He looks at Merck's long-term investment strategy in China, its engagement with the country's innovation ecosystem, and the growing role of AI in biotechnology and cancer treatment.

Tai Po Fire: HKSAR government responds with accountability and reform

CGTN — Sun, 01 Nov 2026 02:56:19 GMT

03:03

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government on Oct. 29 released a report by the Independent Committee reviewing last November's Tai Po fire, which killed 168 people.

Based on 30 hearings and a review of more than a million documents, the report provides a detailed account of the failures behind the disaster.

The HKSAR government's response is built around accountability and reform.

Political responsibility, criminal liability and administrative accountability are all in focus.

At three press briefings on Oct. 29 and 30, the government also outlined a comprehensive package of reforms aimed at preventing similar tragedies.

Chen Yuan explains how efforts to ensure accountability and drive reform were already underway long before the report was released.

Hong Kong's lessons from last year's inferno

Zhu Zheng — Sat, 31 Oct 2026 09:37:23 GMT

Residents affected by the massive fire in Wang Fuk Court last year return to collect their belongings, in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, April 23, 2026. /VCG

Editor's note: Zhu Zheng, a special commentator for CGTN, is an assistant professor focusing on constitutional law and politics at the China University of Political Science and Law. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

The devastating fire at Hong Kong's Wang Fuk Court last year that claimed 168 lives exposed serious failures in building safety and government oversight. The independent committee's investigation report, released this week, makes painful reading.

Yet the special administrative region’s government's response also offers an important lesson: The rule of law is not an obstacle to strong government. It is what makes a strong government responsible and effective.

The rule of law does not mean that the government never fails. It means that failures must be exposed and those responsible held to account. The committee found serious misconduct by contractors and professional consultants, alongside failures by several government departments. Residents had repeatedly raised concerns about fire hazards, but their complaints were passed between authorities without proper action. The Independent Checking Unit (ICU), Hong Kong's statutory and administrative building control body, relied on certificates provided by contractors rather than checking the risks itself.

These findings are deeply troubling. But the independent investigation, its public findings and the government's commitment to accountability show that official failures are not simply swept under the carpet.

Chief Executive John Lee's determination to investigate wrongdoing and hold those responsible to account deserves recognition. The ICU will be disbanded, replaced by a new Public Housing Building Control Section. The housing secretary has already resigned.

A view of Ho Yuet Home, a transitional housing unit provided by the Housing Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, December 1, 2025. /VCG

The tragedy also shows why Hong Kong's executive-led system matters. Hong Kong's Basic Law, unlike the American model of separation of powers, places the chief executive at the center of government, while preserving legislative oversight and judicial independence.

The committee's report shows what happens when these strengths are not fully realized. Responsibility for fire safety was divided among the Buildings Department, the ICU, the Fire Services Department and the Labor Department. Each had its own duties, but no authority took overall responsibility for the risks. The problem was not simply a lack of rules. It was a failure to make the rules work together.

The committee has therefore recommended a cross-departmental task force and a high-level steering committee to oversee reforms. These proposals reflect the strengths of executive-led governance: one clear center of leadership, better co-ordination and greater accountability.

The chief executive is well placed to bring departments together, settle disputes over responsibility and ensure that decisions are carried out. This is a constitutional advantage, not merely an administrative convenience.

Real accountability must prevent the next tragedy, not merely punish those responsible for the past one. The committee has proposed reforms ranging from using fire-resistant materials, and professional supervision to preventing bid-rigging in building maintenance and renovation projects. One important lesson is that regulators must do more than check paperwork. They must verify safety standards, identify risks and act before danger turns into disaster.

The regional government's willingness to address these wider problems is encouraging. But success will depend on turning proposals into clear rules, effective inspections and sustained enforcement. Public safety must become a daily duty, not a concern raised only after tragedy strikes.

The victims of Wang Fuk Court deserve justice, and Hong Kong deserves lasting reform. The government's determination to pursue accountability and improve public safety offers a chance to rebuild public trust.

The lesson is simple: The rule of law makes power accountable, while executive-led governance makes action possible. When the two work together, Hong Kong can turn a painful failure into lasting institutional progress.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)

From Yan'an to the Fifth Plenum: the CPC's commitment to self-reform

Carlos Martinez — Sat, 31 Oct 2026 07:01:25 GMT

Communist Party of China (CPC) officials hold a news conference in Beijing, October 30, 2026, following the conclusion of Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC the previous day. /CFP

Editor's note: Carlos Martinez, a special commentator for CGTN, is a co-founder of the No Cold War campaign and co-editor of Friends of Socialist China based in London. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

In July 1945, the educator Huang Yanpei visited Yan'an, the city in northwest China that was a base of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and put a question to the Party’s leader Mao Zedong. Throughout Chinese history, he observed, dynasties had emerged only to decay over time – their rulers growing complacent, their bureaucracies bloated, their people alienated. Could the Communists escape this historical cycle?

Mao replied that they had found a new path: that of people's democracy, supervision and accountability. "Only when the people are allowed to supervise the government will the government not slacken."

Eighty-one years later, the same question was the central theme of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC, which closed in Beijing on October 29. The plenum adopted a resolution on persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance. Its communiqué stated that the Party "has found two answers to the question of how to escape the historical cycle of rise and fall – "the people's oversight over government and the Party's self-reform."

A longstanding challenge

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels famously wrote that communists "have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole." Maintaining that unity of interests in practice, over the course of more than a century of socialist governance, has thrown up numerous challenges. How can a ruling communist party prevent the emergence of bureaucratism, corruption and privilege? How can it stay in touch with the masses?

As early as 1919, just two years after the October Revolution in Russia, its leader Lenin was already warning that the new Soviet state faced a serious danger: Reactionary elements were "assuming the coloring of communists and, to succeed better in their careers, procuring membership cards of the Russian Communist Party." Such people quite clearly had interests separate from those of the working people, namely, increasing their personal wealth and advancing their careers. Lenin's writings in the final years of his life return again and again to the problem of bureaucracy and to the gap opening up between the party and the masses.

And indeed, in the last decades of the Soviet Union's existence, a privileged layer of officials did emerge; there was a certain fusion of wealth and power; and the masses did become alienated. Things reached a point where the Russian Communist Party's 19 million members did little to resist the dissolution of their party and state in 1991.

Self-reform in theory and practice

Since 2012, the CPC has placed the notion of self-reform (a more literal translation is "self-revolution") at the center of its work. It holds that a ruling party must subject itself to continuous scrutiny, rectification and renewal, because no external force can do the job for it.

The most prominent examples of its implementation are the eight-point decision on work conduct (improving work style and strengthening ties with the people), a substantially strengthened system of supervision, and an anti-corruption campaign of unprecedented scale.

In 2025 alone, 115 officials at provincial or ministerial level and above were placed under investigation, and 983,000 people received disciplinary punishments. Significantly, 33,000 people were investigated for offering bribes: The campaign targets those who seek to buy influence as well as those who sell it.

The fifth plenum builds on this foundation, reaffirming the Party's commitment to self-reform and to the people's oversight of government and seeking to "enhance the Party's capacity for long-term governance."

The communiqué places strong emphasis on primary-level Party organizations and on following "the Party's mass line in the new era." The mass line is among the CPC's oldest and most important principles. In 1943, Mao described it as a method of leadership: Take the scattered and unsystematic ideas of the masses, concentrate them through study into systematic ideas, then return to the masses to propagate and explain them "until the masses embrace them as their own," testing them in action. "From the masses, to the masses" means that leadership is a continuous, two-way, dialectical relationship between the Party and people.

The mass line remains a living practice. During the campaign to eliminate extreme poverty, more than three million officials were sent to live and work in impoverished villages. The drafting of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) drew on millions of suggestions submitted online. Underpinning all of this is a party of 101 million members organized in 5.43 million grassroots organizations. Popular supervision and internal self-reform are thus not alternatives but two sides of the same commitment.

CPC volunteers live-stream to help locals sell sweet melons in a village in Aksu Prefecture, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, China, June 24, 2026. /CFP

None of this means the problems have been solved once and for all; the communiqué's call for accountability where self-supervision fails acknowledges that the work continues. The plenum's confirmation of the expulsion of several senior figures shows that discipline applies at every level, including the very top.

The aim, in the communiqué's words, is to ensure that "the Party always remains a vibrant Marxist governing party that stays at the forefront of the times, enjoys the wholehearted support of the people, and is able to withstand all tests."

Why it matters

Classical Marxist theory was largely concerned with how a party wins power; for obvious reasons, it had much less to say about how a party keeps its character once it has held power for decades, at the head of a market economy with a large private sector, in a world still dominated by capitalism. The market generates constant pressure: the temptation for officials to develop interests of their own, and the attempts of private capital to bend public power to its will. Self-reform is the answer – not abolishing the market, but making sure that the Party, and not capital, sets the direction.

This question has resonance beyond China's borders. Governing parties across the Global South face the same dangers of corruption and a widening gap between leaders and base. Vietnam's "blazing furnace" anti-corruption campaign shows that other ruling communist parties have drawn similar conclusions, and many parties in Africa, Asia and Latin America are studying the CPC's experience closely.

Huang Yanpei's question has not lost its relevance. The CPC has made answering it a permanent feature of governance, and in doing so has made a profound contribution to the theory and practice of Marxist party building.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)

China-US: Seizing the window of opportunity

World Insight with Tian Wei — Fri, 30 Oct 2026 11:30:44 GMT

27:13

Following US President Donald Trump's state visit to China in May and Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to the US in September, the two leaders agreed to build a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability based on respect, fairness and reciprocity. What can be done to enhance trust? How can both sides manage competition and prevent a technological arms race? Will this newfound stability lead to a reset in relations, or is it merely a strategic pause? CGTN's Tian Wei speaks with David Lampton, former president of the National Committee on United States-China relations, on what this new dynamic means for both sides.

Closer look on Xi-Trump summit: Harvard's Prof. Graham Allison

World Insight with Tian Wei — Fri, 30 Oct 2026 11:29:59 GMT

25:02

Chinese President Xi Jinping has wrapped up his state visit to the United States, the first in 11 years. As more details emerge about what the two sides agreed on, the bigger question is: What do these mean for China, the United States and the rest of the world? Shortly after the summit, CGTN's Tian Wei spoke with Professor Graham Allison, the founding dean of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, who's the author of “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap”? Here are his views.

Beware of Japan's cognitive warfare disguised as entertainment

Cao Cong — Fri, 30 Oct 2026 09:15:30 GMT

The Japanese protest against the Sanae Takaichi government's policies in Tokyo, Japan, July 25, 2026. /VCG

Editor's note: Cao Cong, a special commentator for CGTN, is a doctoral candidate at the School of Global and Regional Studies, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

The controversy surrounding Japanese TV drama VIVANT raises questions that go far beyond artistic expression. The suspense thriller series packages Japanese intelligence operatives' overseas activities as heroic exploits and tries to whip up a "China threat" narrative. The intention is clear. It is part of Japan's cognitive warfare against China, this time using pop culture to shape perceptions and security issues, and influence judgments about its changing security policy.

The drama portrays an imaginary "Chinese secret intelligence organization" as a ruthless enemy, whose members chop off people's fingers and carry out stabbings, while directing sympathy around the activities of Japanese operatives. National identity, violence, victimhood and heroism are woven into a nationalistic narrative with a clear emotional direction.

First, an image of the "enemy" is manufactured. Abstract security threats are given recognizable faces and terrifying methods to create a sense of imminent danger. Viewers may not remember exactly what Japanese policy documents say about China, but they are likely to remember Chinese characters inflicting violence and Japanese characters suffering.

This is meant to legitimize Japan's overseas operations. The more brutally the protagonists are shown as having been treated, the easier it becomes to win support for their retaliation. Questions about whether their actions violate another country's sovereignty and accountability are pushed aside by stories of "rescue," "self-defense" and "protecting Japan."

Ultimately, this is an affront to historical memory. The torture depicted in the drama is an inversion of the methods of torture used by invading Japanese forces against Chinese resistance fighters. The suffering inflicted on the Chinese by Japanese militarist aggression must not be forgotten. Attributing similar brutality to contemporary Chinese characters while casting the Japanese as victims fighting back inevitably raises questions about the reversal of perpetrator and victim roles.

Historical responsibility cannot be erased by shifting the camera's perspective, nor can war crimes be diminished by recasting the characters. Creators cannot disregard the historical context, much less build sympathy for their own country by stigmatizing a neighboring country that once bore the brunt of its aggression. Repeatedly reinforcing a sense of national victimhood while whitewashing the history of harm inflicted on others will only weaken Japanese society's capacity to reflect critically on war.

The narrative of this product that purports to be entertainment in reality echoes Japan's actual security discourse on China.

Japan revised its three key security documents in 2022, characterizing China as its "unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge." This is also reiterated in the latest Defense of Japan white paper in 2026. The airing of the TV series coincides with the promotion of this policy agenda and its accompanying public messaging. Its narrative and the official line on China reinforce one another, placing the drama at the cultural end of a broader process of cognitive warfare.

People visit the Museum of the War of the Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing, China, September 2, 2025. /VCG

Japan's official policy documents establish security judgments about China; screen narratives can turn those judgments into fear and anger that audiences feel directly. For Japan's right-wing forces, a China perceived as dangerous, cruel and impervious to dialogue makes it easier to argue for stronger armaments and expanded overseas military activities.

When threats are repeatedly amplified, military restraints can be portrayed as shackles. In such an atmosphere, postwar safeguards – including Japan's pacifist constitution, the exclusively defense-oriented policy and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles – not to possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory – become strategic burdens from assets preserving peace.

Japan's 2026 Diplomatic Bluebook includes a dedicated subsection on "Responding to Information Warfare, Including Countering Disinformation" under "Strategic Communications." Although Japanese official documents use the term "information warfare," the influence operations they describe target the cognitive domain and constitute cognitive warfare in substance.

Moreover, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, for the first time, earmarked dedicated artificial intelligence funding in its fiscal 2027 budget request for "responding to cognitive warfare." This proposed budgetary arrangement itself indicates that the Japanese government is trying to turn cognitive warfare into an institutionalized national undertaking from isolated activities.

Against this backdrop, VIVANT cannot be regarded as an isolated case of a television series that happened to go wrong. The series displays the defining features of a cognitive warfare product: It turns anti-China prejudice into entertainment, packages military operations as heroic missions and uses mass communication to translate these messages into emotional identification among viewers. How hostility toward China is repeatedly being circulated and amplified through commercial production, television broadcasting and public mentions by political figures warrants great concern. This reproducible method of production and dissemination that builds public support for dangerous security policies must be exposed and condemned.

By inflaming confrontation through exaggerated external threats, Japan's right-wing forces are eroding their country's international credibility and harming the long-term interests of the Japanese. Allowing this dangerous tendency to continue will draw Japan away from its postwar path of peaceful development, exacerbate regional tensions and threaten the peace that the world holds dear.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)

Lessons from 2025 fire strengthen Hong Kong's accountability

Kong Qingjiang — Fri, 30 Oct 2026 09:14:39 GMT

Officials apologize for the deadly fire at Wang Fuk Court in Hong Kong last year that killed 168 people, during a press conference in the special administrative region, China, October 29, 2026. /Xinhua

Editor's note: Kong Qingjiang, a special commentator for CGTN, is the dean of the Academy for Foreign-related Rule of Law under the China University of Political Science and Law. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

An independent committee's report on last year's devastating fire at Wang Fuk Court in Hong Kong, released Thursday, marks a milestone for public governance in the special administrative region. The tragedy on November 26, 2025, which claimed 168 lives, exposed shortcomings in building maintenance, engineering oversight and fire safety, and the response mounted by the regional government, including an independent inquiry, full public disclosure of findings and a series of institutional reforms, underscores how its governance continues to be grounded in the rule of law, evidence‑based professional investigation and political accountability.

On December 12, 2025, John Lee Ka‑chiu, chief executive of Hong Kong, announced the establishment of an independent committee chaired by a judge to probe the causes of the catastrophe. The committee convened 30 formal hearings, took evidence from 80 witnesses, considered representations submitted by the parties' legal counsel, and scrutinized over one million documents. The panel explicitly stated that its work would be guided by evidentiary standards and the public interest, free from political calculus or public relations imperatives.

The contributing factors the committee identified were the deployment of non‑fire‑retardant scaffolding netting, highly combustible foam panels, unauthorized penetrations within emergency escape stairwells, lapses in regulatory oversight, and suspected collusive practices and bid‑rigging linked to building maintenance contracts.

Equally noteworthy is the government's decision to publish the report in its entirety and embrace its critical observations. Moving beyond the technical triggers of the blaze, the report candidly exposes governance gaps spanning building management, engineering supervision, fire safety regulation, and the monitoring of industry practitioners and contractors. It further flags deep‑seated systemic vulnerabilities, including excessive dependence on industry self‑regulation, alongside the risk that large‑scale building‑maintenance projects may be exploited for illicit financial gain.

By laying these failings open to public view, the Hong Kong government has demonstrated exemplary transparency in managing a major public safety crisis. This helps counter persistent external misperceptions that accident investigations in Hong Kong are inward‑looking or shrouded in opacity. Instead, the whole process bears testament to a society that prizes empirical facts, upholds independent scrutiny and confronts uncomfortable realities head‑on.

The rescue site in Wang Fuk Court, a residential area in Hong Kong, China, November 27, 2025. /Xinhua

The chief executive's subsequent actions further epitomize the government's ethos. Lee accepted the resignation of the secretary for housing on grounds of political accountability and rolled out urgent remedial measures. These range from clamping down on bid‑rigging in building maintenance work; to setting up a multi‑agency joint task force comprising the police, the Independent Commission Against Corruption, and the Competition Commission; amending the Buildings Ordinance; and tightening inspection regimes and enforcement action. He also led senior officials in a formal bow of apology to the bereaved families and the general public.

There have been further institutional reforms. Following the release of the independent committee's report, the Hong Kong government unveiled an expanded package of systemic reforms, covering enacting legislation to criminalize bid‑rigging in building maintenance works by creating specific statutory offenses and mandating the cross‑departmental task force to crack down on such bid‑rigging offenses.

These reforms align closely with the broader policy priorities articulated in the chief executive's 2026 policy address and Hong Kong's first Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), including enhancing governance performance, protecting people's livelihoods and pursuing balanced development underpinned by security.

To conclude, the Hong Kong government's handling of the Wang Fuk Court fire illustrates that the special administrative region's institutional strength stems not from an absence of failures, but from its capability to conduct independent investigations, practice open disclosure, and translate hard‑won lessons into structural reform. The episode reaffirms Hong Kong's identity as a rule‑of‑law society committed to evidence‑led inquiry, transparent accountability and responsive public governance.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)

Impact of full and rigorous Party self-governance goes beyond China

Pan Deng — Fri, 30 Oct 2026 09:14:15 GMT

The 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) holds its fifth plenary session in Beijing, China, from October 26 to October 29. /Xinhua

Editor's note: Pan Deng is a special commentator on current affairs for CGTN. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

The 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded its fifth plenary session in Beijing on Thursday by codifying the institutional keystone of its national development strategy. By adopting the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC on Certain Major Issues concerning Persevering with Full and Rigorous Party Self-Governance, the CPC formalized a direct causal link between organizational discipline and national modernization.

In the architecture of Chinese governance, the administrative health of the country relies entirely on the rectitude of its ruling core. The CPC exercises comprehensive leadership over state organs, macroeconomic planning and social development. Dedicating a central plenary session to institutional self-reform therefore functions as a critical upgrade to state power. To govern a massive economy undergoing profound structural transformation, the ruling apparatus must first rigorously govern itself. State capacity demands internal order.

Overcoming the historical cycle

The strategic rationale behind the fifth plenum addresses a foundational imperative of Chinese statecraft: How to prevent bureaucratic decay and sustain institutional vitality in the governing organization across generations of continuous rule. Across millennia of Chinese history, imperial dynasties rose through founding vigor and collapsed when administrative complacency and elite rent-seeking severed the state from the populace.

As the leadership core of Chinese modernization, the CPC holds absolute responsibility for the strategic direction of the state. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, sustaining governance across decades of profound economic and social transformation has required building a powerful endogenous mechanism of correction. Over its 105-year journey from a revolutionary movement to the governing party of the world’s largest developing country, the CPC has engineered a system of continuous self-renewal to maintain organizational vitality and ensure strict public accountability.

The plenum communique highlights two definitive answers forged by the Party to escape the historical cycle of rise and fall: people's oversight over the government and the Party's self-reform. Prior to the 18th National Congress in 2012, the CPC confronted a severe reality where the Party leadership had weakened, hollowed out and diluted, creating serious hidden dangers inside the Party, the state and the military.

By turning the blade inward over the past decade, the Central Committee reversed that institutional drift, eliminated severe latent risks within the civilian and military apparatus, and crystallized Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building. Synthesizing Marxist political theory with classical Chinese statecraft, the fifth plenum institutionalized this self-purification as a constitutional norm. Rather than waiting for systemic crises to compel reform, the leadership exercises historical initiative to renew its governing mandate from within.

The Museum of the Communist Party of China in Beijing, China, May 10, 2026. /VCG

Powering economic transition

This historical mechanism directly serves the urgent political economy imperatives of the present. China is in the opening year of its 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) that will run till 2030, a decisive window for laying the foundation of socialist modernization. Navigating this transition requires shifting the national growth engine toward new quality productive forces. Full and rigorous Party self-governance solves key transmission problems through three concrete mechanisms.

First, enforcing strict political discipline and democratic centralism ensures that Central Committee decisions are executed without distortion, accelerating the construction of a unified national market.

Moreover, the plenum's emphasis on governing officials strictly and instilling a correct view of political performance realigns cadre evaluation metrics. Local leaders are incentivized to pursue long-term industrial upgrading, ecological sustainability and public welfare rather than chasing short-term GDP spikes.

Furthermore, weaving a tight institutional cage around public power protects the efficiency of capital allocation. In an essay in Qiushi Journal on October 15, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping warned that whenever formal regulations fail to operate with teeth, unspoken rules and political brokers proliferate. By advancing an integrated strategy so that officials do not dare to be corrupt, cannot be corrupt and have no desire to be corrupt, Beijing severs the link between regulatory power and illicit capital. Confirming disciplinary expulsions of senior civilian and military figures at the plenum alongside grassroots enforcement sends an unmistakable market signal. Clean governance lowers transaction costs.

By pairing strict accountability with explicit support for creative, reality-based policy implementation at the local level, the CPC balances centralized discipline with administrative vitality. Cadres are bound by ironclad rules regarding integrity and political loyalty, yet empowered to pioneer practical solutions adapted to regional economic conditions.

Anchoring global predictability

Looking toward the future, the fifth plenum decision to convene the 21st National Congress in the second half of 2027 underscores the institutional predictability of Chinese modernization. As the critical milestone for advancing the second centenary goal – building a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC – approaches, codifying a full and rigorous Party self-governance ensures absolute strategic continuity. The upcoming congress will convene during a decisive phase for basically realizing socialist modernization and executing the 15th FYP.

By permanently institutionalizing internal discipline today, the Central Committee guarantees that the administrative vitality required to navigate profound economic transformation remains uninterrupted. This structural resilience ensures that the governing core continues to overcome historical inertia while securing the long-term trajectory of national rejuvenation.

For the international community, the outcomes of the fifth plenum carry profound macroeconomic and geopolitical weight. At a time when much of the global economy is buffeted by partisan gridlock, populist volatility and abrupt policy reversals, China's ability to execute multi-decade development blueprints relies entirely on the cohesion of its governing party.

A disciplined party of over 100 million members that systematically insulates public policy from vested interests and aligns capital allocation with long-term national development provides a powerful stabilizer for global development. By proving that a modernizing state can perpetually reform its own leadership core, China secures the long-term momentum required for national rejuvenation while anchoring certainty in a fractured world.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)

Genomics the next front of US tech rivalry against China?

Adriel Kasonta — Fri, 30 Oct 2026 09:13:58 GMT

A biotechnology company’s production line for laboratory consumables meant for molecular diagnostics and genetic testing in Hangzhou, east China's Zhejiang Province, April 16, 2026. /VCG

Editor's note: Adriel Kasonta, a special commentator for CGTN, is a London-based foreign affairs analyst. He is the founder of AK Consultancy and former chairman of the International Affairs Committee at Bow Group, the oldest conservative think tank in the UK. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

The US decision to add three genomics firms affiliated to the Beijing Genomics Institute to its ban on imports made with "forced labor" is significant. DNA sequencing is becoming cheaper, faster and more scalable, reshaping the economics of an industry that is increasingly strategically important. The question is whether governments can distinguish genuine human-rights enforcement from technological competition when the two increasingly overlap.

On Wednesday, Washington added BGI Genomics, MGI Tech and Shenzhen BGI Technology to the so-called Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List. The Department of Homeland Security says BGI Genomics conducted "genetic testing" in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in northwest China alongside regional authorities and that such activities facilitated forced labor involving Uygurs and other persecuted groups. It also says MGI supplied equipment and support.

By invoking forced-labor concerns to impose restrictions on Chinese biotechnology companies, the US is in essence turning a human-rights issue into an instrument of geopolitical and technological rivalry, undermining the principles of fair competition and free trade in an apparent effort to curb China's growing competitiveness in the sector. The allegations of forced labor in Xinjiang are unfounded, and they should not be used to justify the suppression of Chinese enterprises. BGI Group and MGI have rejected the allegations, while China has dismissed the US claims and accused Washington of suppressing Chinese companies.

The legal mechanism is important. The designation creates a rebuttable presumption that goods produced or manufactured by the listed entities use forced labor, enabling US Customs and Border Protection to block their entry unless importers overcome that presumption. It’s an administrative trade action, not a judicial finding that all the products manufactured by these companies are made with forced labor.

Yet, the economic significance extends beyond the immediate trade restriction. MGI has built a competing sequencing platform around its DNBSEQ technology. Its DNBSEQ-T20×2 system is marketed as capable of bringing the cost of sequencing a human genome below $100 under high-volume conditions. This is a company benchmark rather than the total cost of a clinical genomic test, but is still an indication of how rapidly sequencing economics is changing.

That matters because the sequencing business is not simply a contest over who sells the cheapest machine. American biotechnology company Illumina's 2025 annual report shows that consumables accounted for 74% of its revenue in 2025, compared with 11% for instruments. Its installed base, reagents, software and services create an ecosystem in which switching technologies is not costless. Illumina reported core revenue of about $4.34 billion and an installed base of roughly 21,000 systems. The company expects competition to intensify and new competitors to emerge.

That’s the strategic interest of the BGI-MGI challenge. A cheaper or more competitive sequencing platform can pressure an incumbent beyond the point of sale, across the broader value chain. As sequencing gets faster and cheaper, more value can be pushed downstream into bioinformatics, artificial intelligence (AI), genomic databases, clinical interpretation and precision medicine. The real fight is increasingly for control of the ecosystem that translates genetic information into usable knowledge.

An undated photo of a Rwandan delegation visiting BGI Genomics. /Xinhua

None of this proves that Washington's decision was driven by commercial protectionism. The rationale given is forced labor and human rights, and the evidence should decide those questions. If a company has "enabled forced labor or serious abuses," it is responsible, regardless of nationality. But the measure now sits inside a much broader US-China technology rivalry; here biotechnology is increasingly treated as a strategic capability. Once commercial technologies become entangled with national security, data sovereignty and geopolitical power, ordinary competition becomes harder to distinguish from strategic containment.

Washington and Beijing don't have to decouple to reshape the industry fully. Restrictions can push suppliers to diversify, customers to look for alternatives and governments to build domestic capabilities. Over time, risk management can become an industrial separation, with different standards, supply chains and technology ecosystems growing up around the same scientific foundations.

For genomics, the costs of that fragmentation would extend beyond corporate balance sheets. DNA sequencing is at the heart of biomedical research, cancer studies, rare-disease investigation and precision medicine. If platforms, data systems and research networks are less interoperable, costs may rise, and scientific discoveries may take longer to cross borders.

The next phase of competition will therefore extend beyond sequencing hardware. US and Chinese companies are likely to compete across the full stack – instruments, reagents, software, AI, genomic data and clinical applications – while governments seek greater control over the supply chains and information infrastructure behind them.

Washington should keep two questions separate: Has a company enabled forced labor or other serious abuses? If the evidence establishes that, there should be consequences. Can its technology compete on price, performance and innovation? That is a market question, and markets answer it best through competition.

The two propositions are not contradictory. The real test is whether governments can enforce legitimate human rights and security standards without automatically treating every successful foreign competitor as a strategic threat. Genomics is too consequential to become another zero-sum arena where geopolitical rivalry determines who gets to innovate, collaborate and benefit.

The question is not whether genomics will become strategic. It already has. The question is whether strategic competition will improve the technology better – or make it harder for the world to use.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)

VIVANT's torture scenes distort Japan's aggression history

Xu Ying — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 13:29:05 GMT

The new evidence of Unit 731 unveiled by the Exhibition Hall of Evidences of Crime Committed by Unit 731 of the Japanese Imperial Army in Harbin, northeast China's Heilongjiang Province, August 13, 2025. /Xinhua

Editor's note: Xu Ying is a Beijing-based international affairs commentator for CGTN. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

A television drama has taken torture methods associated with Imperial Japan's wartime atrocities in China and placed them in the hands of Chinese characters. This is not merely a creative misstep or a question of artistic license. When historically documented forms of cruelty are detached from their perpetrators and reassigned to their victims, the result is a dangerous distortion of historical memory. China's indignation is therefore entirely justified.

Atrocities far from stretch of imagination

In the second season of VIVANT, Chinese characters cut off fingers, pierce an abdomen and leave a captive under the scorching sun while interrogating a Japanese intelligence officer. These scenes may be presented as fiction, but their imagery has a disturbing historical provenance.

Japanese war criminal Gisaburo Ikeda confessed to killing Chinese civilians by driving a bayonet through their abdomens. Kiyoshi Kawashima , associated with Unit 731, testified to the horrific physical condition of Chinese victims. Such accounts belong to the historical record of Japan's wartime aggression, not to an abstract vocabulary of fictional cruelty.

Bayonet attacks and the mutilation of Chinese civilians are documented in accounts of the invasion. When imagery associated with these crimes reappears with Chinese characters as perpetrators and a Japanese officer as victim, the moral positions are dramatically reversed.

That reversal demands scrutiny. Why select such historically charged imagery when countless fictional alternatives could convey brutality? Artistic freedom allows creators to imagine. It does not exempt them from questions about the historical meaning of their choices.

How historical context disappears

The mechanism is deceptively simple. First, retain the vivid details that make an image emotionally powerful. Second, remove the historical context that identifies the perpetrators and victims. Third, place those details in a new narrative in which the moral roles are reversed.

No explicit historical claim needs to be made. Audiences absorb the images and draw their own conclusions. So, fiction can reshape historical associations without openly disputing a single archival document.

The wider circulation of a production through television, entertainment programs and political endorsements can amplify its influence. Popular culture is far from a neutral medium: repeated images help shape how societies understand themselves and others.

The danger lies, not simply in depicting violence, but in reproducing historically recognizable forms of violence while obscuring their origins. When the perpetrator's identity fades and the victim assumes the role of aggressor, the narrative may reinforce precisely the misconceptions that historical education should correct.

A view of a special exhibition on the shooting process of Evil Unbound, a film about Unit 731, in Harbin, northeast China's Heilongjiang Province, September 17, 2025. /Xinhua

Victim made to bear burden again

For Chinese audiences, the issue carries a particular historical weight. The invasion wrought mass killings, torture, human experimentation and immeasurable suffering on China. The descendants of its victims have a legitimate interest in how these events are remembered and represented.

When imagery associated with Japanese wartime atrocities is reassigned to Chinese characters, the injury is compounded. The original victims risk being transformed into threatening figures in someone else's moral narrative, while a Japanese character is positioned to receive the audience's sympathy.

Consider the reverse scenario: if a Japanese prime-time drama depicted Chinese victims' documented suffering as crimes committed by Chinese characters against Japanese captives, would audiences and officials in Japan dismiss every objection as excessive sensitivity? The question exposes the double standard that can arise when historical memory is treated as a resource to be rearranged for dramatic effect.

Trouble with "it is only a drama"

Some will argue that audiences can distinguish fiction from fact. Yet, historical memory is shaped not only by textbooks and archives, but also by films, television and the images repeatedly circulated in popular culture.

Revisionism does not always announce itself through an explicit denial of historical facts. Sometimes, it works through omission, ambiguity and the gradual displacement of responsibility. A perpetrator disappears from the story, a victim becomes an aggressor, and the audience is left with an altered emotional impression of the past.

The historical record of Japanese aggression rests on documentary evidence, survivor testimony, confessions and judicial proceedings. These materials cannot be casually displaced by fictional narratives without raising serious questions about historical responsibility.

Japan's post-war reckoning remains an important part of its relationship with neighboring countries. Many Japanese scholars, journalists and citizens have worked to preserve the truth about wartime aggression. Their efforts deserve recognition. Criticism of historical distortion should not be confused with hostility toward Japanese society as a whole.

The issue is whether creative production contributes to historical understanding or weakens it by obscuring who committed particular crimes and who suffered them.

Accountability is the minimum requirement

The appropriate response should be clear.

First, the production team should explain the historical research behind these scenes and address concerns about their resemblance to documented wartime atrocities. Where the portrayal has distorted historical associations, the creators should acknowledge the problem publicly and correct the record.

Second, broadcasters and producers should strengthen historical consultation for works dealing with war crimes, mass violence and other traumatic historical events. Consultation with historians and affected communities need not constrain creativity. It can make storytelling more credible and compelling.

Third, political figures should exercise particular care when endorsing entertainment that touches on unresolved historical grievances. Political support can give a production significance beyond ordinary fiction, especially when neighboring countries remain sensitive to how wartime responsibility is portrayed.

Honesty about the past in facing the future

China has consistently advocated taking history as a mirror while looking toward the future in its relations with Japan. Japan's path toward trust with its neighbors lies not in redistributing the imagery of past atrocities, but in confronting the record and ensuring that future generations understand it. Germany's post-war experience offers an important lesson: credibility grows when responsibility is acknowledged, not when the historical burden is shifted elsewhere.

Bayonets, mutilation and torture are not merely generic symbols of human cruelty when they are rooted in documented historical events. They carry context, victims and perpetrators. Detaching those elements from one another risks turning remembrance into misrepresentation.

A drama can invent characters and construct fictional conflicts. It should not be beyond criticism when its imagery appears to transfer the historical burden of aggression from one nation to the people who suffered it.

Historical crimes demand historical honesty. When the past is recast in ways that blur responsibility, the proper response is not to silence questions, but to answer them– and to correct the record where necessary.

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From resolve to rules: Building institutional synergy for self-reform

Song Yuehong — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 12:06:18 GMT

An exterior view of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China /Xinhua

Editor's note: Song Yuehong, a special commentator on current affairs for CGTN, is deputy director and research fellow at the Institute of Contemporary China Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The article reflects the author's views and not necessarily those of CGTN.

The fifth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded in Beijing on October 29. According to the communique issued after the session, the meeting adopted the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Certain Major Issues concerning Persevering with Full and Rigorous Party Self-Governance.

At the session, the guiding principles for persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance were highlighted as follows: serving the Party's missions and tasks; taking strengthening the Party politically as the overarching principle; exercising rigorous governance across the board; adopting a problem-oriented approach; upholding fundamental principles and breaking new ground; adhering to a top-down approach; and running the Party according to regulations.

Sustained efforts to exercise full and rigorous Party self-governance aim to strengthen the Party's sense of mission and resolve, consolidate its solidarity and unity, preserve the integrity of its membership, and improve its governance capacity and leadership. These efforts help ensure steady progress in Chinese modernization.

An important task in this endeavor in the new era is to confine power in "a cage of institutions." Strengthening Party leadership is central to full and rigorous Party self-governance; comprehensive coverage provides the foundation, rigor is the key, and effective governance is essential.

Since the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, the Party has continued to uphold and strengthen its overall leadership and the centralized, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee. With strengthening itself politically as its overarching guide, it has improved its systems for full and rigorous self-governance and advanced all areas of Party building in a coordinated manner.

Systems thinking and scientific methods are essential to ensuring that the Party's governance covers all relevant content and targets, duties are performed at all levels and links, and all systems complement one another. The aim is to further improve a comprehensive, fully functioning, well-regulated and efficient system for full and rigorous Party self-governance.

This requires a closely connected organizational system that ensures effective implementation and enables Party organizations at all levels to fulfill their political and organizational functions. It also requires an education system that reinforces convictions, builds cohesion and strengthens Party consciousness, helping members and officials translate the strategy of full and rigorous self-governance into conscious action.

A targeted oversight system must address both symptoms and root causes, making Party self-governance more precise and effective. Rigorous requirements must apply to every aspect of this work, every Party organization and every member.

A sound and effective institutional system must bring individual rules and mechanisms into a coherent whole. Institution-building must respond to the needs of Party self-governance and support all areas of Party building, reinforcing institutional constraints on power.

Governing the Party through institutions, and in accordance with regulations, also requires stronger enforcement. The reform of intra-Party regulations and systems must continue, with better overall planning, the identification and closure of loopholes, and improvements in quality and efficiency. These efforts will advance full and rigorous Party self-governance within a framework of rules and institutions.

Full and rigorous Party self-governance has opened new ground in the century-old Party's self-reform, contributing to historic achievements and transformations in the cause of the Party and the country. It has enabled the Party and the people to seize the historical initiative in building a strong Party and country.

The Party must take responsibility for its own governance, and effective governance requires rigor. The CPC Central Committee has attached great importance to developing rules and institutions, improving anti-corruption mechanisms and strengthening enforcement. Coordinated efforts must ensure that officials do not have the audacity, opportunity or desire to become corrupt. Rules must function as live "high-voltage lines," enabling full and rigorous Party self-governance to advance with higher standards and more concrete measures.

An exhibition area dedicated to education on Party conduct and integrity building at an education center in Yancheng City, Jiangsu Province, China, July 10, 2025. /VCG

A responsibility system with clearly identified duties and requirements is essential. Responsibilities must be specified at different levels and for different categories, so that Party organizations, members and officials understand, assume and fulfill their duties.

Party committees (leading Party members groups) bear the principal responsibility for full and rigorous Party self-governance. This includes strengthening leadership over the work, selecting and appointing officials properly, supervising and constraining the exercise of power, and safeguarding the people's interests. Discipline inspection commissions at all levels bear supervisory responsibility, requiring effective oversight, strict discipline enforcement and precise accountability.

These political responsibilities must form a complete chain encompassing principal responsibility, supervisory responsibility, the primary responsibility of those heading Party organizations, and leading officials' dual responsibilities for their regular work and Party self-governance.

Officials must be strict with themselves, fulfill their responsibilities and exercise rigorous management over those under their supervision. Responsibility must be reinforced at every level. Clearly identifying who is responsible, specifying what is required, and ensuring effective evaluation and accountability can help foster an atmosphere of rigor and a culture of integrity, turning responsibilities into action.

The "rigor" in full and rigorous Party self-governance serves to clarify direction, establish rules, improve conduct and strengthen resistance to corruption. It aims to foster a clean and upright political environment within the Party and create favorable conditions for officials to fulfill their duties and take the initiative, further encouraging the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity of the entire Party.

The central Party leadership's eight-point decision on improving conduct was a concrete initiative to build public trust and a landmark measure for Party self-governance in the new era. By establishing firm rules and binding constraints and improving institutional mechanisms, the CPC Central Committee has worked to consolidate and extend its implementation and make improvements in Party conduct regular and lasting.

The requirements of the Party's self-reform must be fully implemented. Strengthening Party consciousness, improving conduct and enforcing discipline must proceed together, while efforts to rectify misconduct, tighten discipline and combat corruption must reinforce one another. Rigorous standards, measures and enforcement must be sustained over the long term.

All Party members, especially leading officials, must remember that self-reform is an ongoing endeavor. They must cultivate their character, exercise self-discipline, guard against privilege-seeking attitudes and practices, and firmly resist misconduct and corruption. By preserving their integrity, they can help improvements in the Party and government conduct to foster better conduct throughout society.

The fight against corruption must continue with unwavering resolve and sustained pressure. Efforts to rectify misconduct, enforce discipline and combat corruption must deepen without pause or retreat. Continued work is needed to eliminate the conditions that allow corruption to arise and foster a clean and upright political environment.

Sustained full and rigorous Party self-governance enables the Party to use its self-reform to guide broader social transformation. Rigorous requirements must be applied throughout Party building, enabling the Party to continually purify, improve and renew itself and strengthen its capabilities. This helps ensure that it remains a vibrant Marxist governing party that stays at the forefront of the times, enjoys the wholehearted support of the people, withstands all tests, and serves as the strong leadership core for building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)

Cebu chessboard: How Washington turns partners into pawns

First Voice — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 08:47:29 GMT

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. /Xinhua

Editor's note: CGTN's First Voice provides instant commentary on breaking stories. The column clarifies emerging issues and better defines the news agenda, offering a Chinese perspective on the latest global events.

On the sidelines of the 20th ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth sat down separately with his Japanese and Philippine counterparts – and with several other regional ministers – to discuss "effective denial defense in the First Island Chain," "close coordination" on munitions production, and a proposed US-ASEAN defense framework.

The language is bureaucratic. The reality is not. What Washington is assembling in the region is not a defensive architecture. It is a forward-leaning military posture that uses the Philippines and Japan as political cover – all while insisting that the goal is "stability."

Consider the material facts. The US Army's Typhon mid-range missile system was deployed to the Philippines, specifically Luzon, in 2024. Washington calls it "deterrence," but, in essence, it is destabilizing the region. The distinction is semantic: A weapon designed for offensive strike, based on an ally's territory and pointed at a third country's homeland, is not a shield. It is a spear held by someone else's hand.

The Philippines is not the only hand. In Cebu, Japan agreed to continue discussions toward transferring Abukuma-class destroyers after their retirement and one TC-90 patrol aircraft within Japan's fiscal 2027 – a plan, not a completed delivery, but a clear step toward integrating Manila into Tokyo's defense-industrial orbit.

Tokyo and Washington also pledged continued coordination on munitions production and "denial defense" along the First Island Chain. Japan's own constitutional constraints on collective self-defense have been stretched and reinterpreted for years; the Cebu meetings accelerate a quiet remilitarization that serves American strategy far more than it serves Japanese security. The more Japan ties its defense industrial base and maritime posture to American contingency planning, the less room it has for the diplomacy that actually reduces tension with its neighbors.

The most revealing move, however, is institutional. Hegseth used Cebu to propose a new US-ASEAN Framework for Defense Cooperation. The proposal is deliberately vague on details, but its function is clear: to create a parallel bilateral-multilateral track that bypasses ASEAN's consensus-based, China-inclusive processes.

Guests pose for a group photo at the opening ceremony of the 48th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit and related meetings in Cebu, the Philippines, May 8, 2026. /Xinhua

ASEAN's strength has always been its refusal to become a proxy bloc. The ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus includes China because regional security cannot be arranged against the region's largest state. A US-ASEAN defense framework that emphasizes "maritime domain awareness" and naval interoperability – while saying nothing about the Code of Conduct negotiations that China and ASEAN have been advancing – is designed to erode that inclusiveness.

It invites ASEAN members to hedge toward Washington's camp under the banner of "pragmatism," not to solve disputes but to militarize them. Washington is not "responding" to a crisis. It is manufacturing the conditions in which crisis becomes the default.

The cost of this strategy is borne by the countries Washington claims to protect. The Philippines, already engaged in years of maritime confrontations, is being converted from a sovereign claimant with its own diplomatic options into a frontline node in a US-China competition it cannot control. Japan, for its part, is being drawn deeper into the Taiwan question where any intervention would invite countermeasures that it cannot afford.

Disputes must be managed by the parties directly concerned – not by extra-regional powers with their own strategic agendas. That is why Beijing has continued to push for an early conclusion of the Code of Conduct with ASEAN. The contrast is instructive. One side is building missile launchers and "denial" networks. The other is building negotiating text.

Cebu was not a turning point. It was another increment in a campaign to turn allies into assets and partners into pawns. The question for Southeast Asia is whether it will let its institutions be hollowed out by a framework designed elsewhere, for purposes that have little to do with the region's own peace.

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When security concerns reach the classroom

Imran Khalid — Wed, 28 Oct 2026 08:42:39 GMT

American children write their Chinese names using calligraphy brushes under the guidance of Confucius Institute teachers, during a Chinese New Year cultural carnival held at the Discovery Center in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, United States, February 3, 2019. /CFP

Editor's note: Imran Khalid, a special commentator for CGTN, is a freelance columnist on international affairs. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth chose a social media video to deliver the verdict. Confucius Institutes, the Pentagon chief said, now sit on his department's list of institutions that threaten American national security, and some 80 programs at 30 universities linked to them had been "systematically dismantled" over the past two months.

He offered a label and no evidence. Neither he nor the Pentagon cited a single case of stolen intellectual property. What the designation actually targets are classrooms where Americans practice Chinese tones, write characters with a brush and learn how a Lunar New Year is celebrated. Calling that a security threat is not a finding. It is a smear.

Consider how these institutes came to exist. None was imposed on an American campus. Each began with a written agreement that an American university chose to sign with a Chinese partner, under the same governance that applies to any other academic collaboration. When the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined 90 such agreements in 2019, it found that the directors at its 10 case-study schools were employees of the American university, and school officials said campus rules, curriculum included, applied to the institutes. A bipartisan Senate investigation the same year found no pattern of “egregious incidents” of research being suppressed. Since 2020, the global network has been coordinated by the Chinese International Education Foundation, a non-governmental body founded by 27 members, Peking and Fudan universities among them.

Chinese partner universities supplied teachers and teaching materials; the American host set the rules for using them. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun described these exchanges on Monday as two-way and mutually beneficial, which is an accurate account of how a language partnership works.

Now apply Washington's own standard to Washington. The State Department runs about 600 American Spaces in some 140 countries. Its American Corners sit "often in libraries or on university campuses," offering English courses, advice on applying to US colleges, films and debate clubs. In Washington's vocabulary, that is public diplomacy. The same activity travelling in the opposite direction becomes a threat designation. Culture is welcome when it leaves America and suspect when it arrives.

The approach reflects a Cold War mindset, and the policies Washington has chosen illustrate why. Section 1286 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 established a framework for identifying foreign institutions and talent programs that the US government considers a risk to national security, particularly in relation to access to US-funded research and technology. The Pentagon's fiscal 2025 list included about 130 foreign academic and research institutions, primarily in China, Russia and Iran. It was not a list of language or cultural exchange programs.

Yet the Pentagon's scrutiny has extended beyond the institutions named on the list. In August 2026, it ordered 30 US universities to review their academic, financial and research ties to foreign entities of concern, including organizations associated with rebranded Confucius Institutes. The Pentagon reported in October that the reviews had resulted in more than 80 actions to terminate partnerships. These included not only ties with listed entities but also precautionary terminations involving organizations that did not appear on the list. Such measures risk discouraging legitimate educational and cultural exchanges well beyond the partnerships directly under scrutiny.

Young performers showcase martial arts to celebrate the Chinese New Year during an NBA regular-season game in San Francisco, California, January 22, 2023. /CFP

The cost falls on ordinary Americans. Educational ties between the two countries were built by people, not by security agencies. In late December 1978, 52 Chinese scholars left Beijing for American campuses. By 2024-2025, the number of Chinese students in the United States had reached 265,919, according to Open Doors. The same data counts 1,749 Americans who studied in China for credit the year before. Chinese families have spent nearly five decades learning about America. The gap in understanding sits on the other side.

Confucius Institutes helped narrow it by bringing the language to the American students' own campus, at little cost to the university. When they closed, schools felt the loss: GAO found 43 of them turning to their own academic departments to keep Chinese teaching alive. The Modern Language Association counted 105 fewer Chinese programs at American colleges in 2021 than in 2016. Every barrier of this kind narrows the right of American universities, and of the American public, to learn about a country their economy is bound up with.

Beijing, on the other hand, has kept its own door open. At the White House on September 24, Chinese President Xi Jinping invited 100,000 young Americans to China over five years, after an earlier target of 50,000 was met ahead of schedule. One month later, the Pentagon called Chinese lessons on American campuses a threat.

Exchanges in education and culture should stay open and inclusive. Washington's part is simple: Set aside the suspicion, stop interfering in cooperation that universities chose freely, and protect the channels through which Americans and Chinese come to know each other. The young Americans who accept Xi's invitation deserve to arrive having been encouraged, not warned, by their own government.

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